UNITED STATED
DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON
DIVISION
EDMUND B. HEIMLICH, $
$
Plaintiff $
$
V. $ CIVIL
ACTION NO.
$
THE STATE OF TEXAS AND $
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL $
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL $ ________________
JOHNNY B. HOLMES, Individually $
CHARLES (CHUCK) ROSENTHAL, Individually $
JOHN BOONE, Individually $
MILTON OJEMAN, Individually $
$
Defendants. $
___________________________________________________________________________
PLAINTIFFS’ ORIGINAL COMPLAINT and JURY DEMAND
_____________________________________________________
3.0
BACKGROUND
3.01.
Plaintiff had a 20 year career in the Real Estate Profession.
Beginning in 1976 when licensed as a Real Estate Agent in the State of Ohio and
as an Appraiser under contract for a County government in that State. Plaintiff
graduated with honors with a four year degree in Finance with a concentration
in the study of Real Estate from Wright State University. While there Plaintiff
was awarded the prestigious Thomas Welsh Real Estate award “for his fine
academic performance in the area of Real Estate”.
3.02.
In 1980 Plaintiff relocated to Texas where he
distinguished himself in the employment as a manager of large commercial Real
Estate for National Companies. In this capacity he was entrusted with over
$50,000 per month in rental receipts. Much of which was in the form of cash. He
enjoyed an honorable reputation and the trust of his employers.
3.03.
In 1980 he satisfied the requirements to became a
licensed Real Estate agent in the State of Texas. In 1988 he satisfied the
state’s requirements for licensure as a Real Estate Broker and established his
own firm in August of that year. For the five years of it’s existence his
brokerage business was located at 10375 Richmond Avenue in Houston, Texas.
During this time he was the sponsoring broker of over 40 real estate agents and
was responsible for the actions of as many as 21 full time agents operating
from his facilities at one time.
3.04.
The suit arises out of the improper and unwarranted
seizure of funds from the business account of Heimlich and criminal prosecution
of Heimlich in a criminal case instituted in 1993. The subsequent indictment
was ruinous to Heimlich and caused him to feel compelled to leave the Real
Estate business never to return. His experience with the Harris County District
Attorney’s office has made him reluctant to ever do business again in the State
of Texas.
3.05.
He was forced by their action to maintain his residence
in Texas and was unable to clear his name until March 11, 1999. On that day his
long awaited vindication was provided by the Opinion of
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals for the State of Texas. The Court ordered
the judgment against Heimlich be reversed, the indictment be dismissed, and
Heimlich acquitted.
3.06. The indictment of Heimlich mean that even well-established economic transactions, fully in compliance with contracts promulgated by the Texas Real Estate Commission, create unpredictable prospects of criminal prosecution, which undermine, among others, the business judgment rule and constitutional provisions against the impairment of contracts.
3.07.
The success of the Harris County District Attorney’s
Office in seizing funds from the business account of Heimlich’s brokerage sends
a destructive message to businesspeople exercising normal and necessary
business judgment. It means that they can be transformed unexpectedly into jailbirds
by a combination of illogic and speculation. Above all, if one engages in
transactions that state law declares are lawful, one is subject to implication
of crimes based on speculation of “intent” when utilizing privileges provided
by contract and no crime has been committed.
3.08.
This action of Harris County’s District Attorney has
real consequences to people who will take this case as an example of how their
own transactions may later be distorted in criminal prosecutions. It is not
just conviction of a crime that businesspeople must fear. A prosecution such as
this one, even if it terminates in acquittal, is ruinous; mere designation as a
target is disastrous. Businesspeople cannot afford to risk even the possibility
that their actions will be viewed as unlawful. Instead, they will, as Heimlich
has done, seek safe harbors. All incentive for innovation, entrepreneurial
enterprise, and productivity will be lost.
3.09. Evidently, one cannot use such sources as, well established commercial law, The Texas Real Estate licensing act, and even contracts promulgated by the State’s own attorneys, because those sources were knowingly disregarded by the defendants' actions here. Laws and contracts are commonly relied upon to resolve the numerous issues of ambiguous fact that inevitably arise in even the simplest transactions. Now law and contracts are meaningless when they can be overruled by the arbitrary judgment of a investigator or prosecutor. Thus, the result of this conviction will be to stifle business transactions and indeed the result will be to stifle even necessary and well-established kinds of economic transactions. It therefore becomes necessary for Heimlich to seek redress and remedy from this court.
4.0
FACTS - I
4.01. A competent white-collar defense lawyer in 1993 would have advised Plaintiff that his actions were lawful. In fact; the State Attorney General’s office and the Department of Justice in Washington DC did just that. They advised Heimlich his actions were lawful and that the actions of the Assistant District Attorney were not within legal bounds or the realm of his authority. Heimlich relayed this information to Assistant DA Boone and to his superior Assistant Attorney (DA Holmes’ “number two man”) Charles “Chuck” Rosenthal. Their response was a vindictive and aggressive ‘win at all costs’ prosecution of Heimlich. They became intent upon ‘showing Heimlich’ they, of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, are above the law and answerable to no higher authority.
4.02.
The seizure, indictment, and conviction perpetrated by
the Harris County District Attorney’s office against Heimlich threatens the
business judgment rule and the Rule of Law upon which this nation prides
itself.
4.03. John Boone, Assistant District Attorney and chief of the Check Fraud Division, and Milton Ojeman, investigator in the District Attorny’s office working under the direction of John Boone, intentionally and knowingly, denied Heimlich his Constitutional rights. Boone, while acting in the role of a law enforcement officer, and his investigator Ojeman, utilized their positions, under color of authority, to seize property and charge Heimlich with a crime they knew was a legal impossibility. On March 11, 1999 the Fourteenth Court of Appeals for the State of Texas acknowledged that Heimlich had committed no crime. The judgment of conviction of Edmund B. Heimlich was ordered to be reversed, the indictment be dismissed, and the appellant (Heimlich) acquitted. A true and correct copy of Opinion is attached as Exhibit A.
4.04. Heimlich was the Broker/Owner of a Real Estate Brokerage. Under his sponsorship was Eric Pettorino, a licensed Real Estate agent and Independent Contractor of Heimlich’s Brokerage. There was a contractual agreement between Heimlich and Pettorino detailing the terms and conditions of Heimlich’s sponsorship of Pettorino (Exhibit B). This contract was drafted by a staff of attorneys working with the State and promulgated by the State Agency the Texas Real Estate Commission under the auspices of the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act!!
4.05. In the Course of their business Heimlich placed a stop-pay on a post-dated check issued to Pettorino (Exhibit C). The stop-pay was lawful and consistent with the terms of the contract between Heimlich and Pettorino, the commercial laws and statues of the State of Texas.
4.06. Pettorino made complaint to John Boone alleging Heimlich was “trying” to steal his money. The complainant never accused Heimlich of a crime. His only statement was he “suspected” a ‘bad intent’. Pettorino did not sign the affidavit in support of the warrant to seize the funds.
4.07. Pettorino testified he was instructed by Boone to send Heimlich a 10 day demand letter (Exhibit D). As to John Boone’s conduct during the investigative stage of this proceeding, Boone clearly went beyond his duties as an investigator when he initiated an unlawful seizure, in violation of Heimlich’s Constitutional right, by instructing Heimlich’s bank to freeze his account.
4.08. When Heimlich discovered the freeze he was told to call John Boone. Heimlich made repeated calls to John Boone’s office but was told Boone was "out-to-lunch" or "training a class". Without a discussion with the District Attorney’s office and a release of the hold on the funds at the bank it was impossible for Heimlich to make settlement with Pettorino. Heimlich then called the State of Texas Attorney Generals office and spoke to Mr. Shane Phelps. He advised Heimlich a stop pay was not a criminal offense. Exhibit E is attached as evidence of Heimlich’s phone call to the Texas State Attorney General at 512-463-2191 and 512-320-5370.
4.09. Heimlich then called the Department of Justice in Washington D.C and spoke to Joseph Gangloff of the office of Public Integrity. Heimlich was, likewise, informed that no District Attorney, of any County, within the United States had the authority to instruct Heimlich’s bank to place a freeze or hold on his account. Exhibit E is attached as evidence of Heimlich’s call to The Department of Justice at 202-514-2000.
4.10. Heimlich again called for Boone. When told he was unavailable Heimlich asked for John Boone’s superior and was referred to Chuck Rosenthal. Only then did Boone return Heimlich’s calls. Heimlich expressed his displeasure with the hold that prevented him from settling his affairs with Pettorino. Heimlich conveyed to Boone that both the Attorney General’s Office and the Department of Justice advised Heimlich that Boone had no authority to instruct Heimlich’s Bank place to place a hold on his account. Boone became agitated upon hearing Heimlich had spokent to the State Attorney General and the Department of Justice and hung up on Heimlich.
4.11. Boone’s vindictive response was the next day when Boone prepared and presented a misleading, fraudulent, affidavit to a magistrate, secured a warrant, and had the money seized from Heimlich’s account and moved to the county registry.
4.12. Boone testified he drafted and reviewed the affidavit attached to the warrant to seize the disputed funds (see Exhibit F , copy of pg 113 of trial transcripts). Boone knew the affidavit to be fraudulent by the very contradictions between the statements in the affidavit and the contract (Exhibit B) Boone attached to the affidavit. Ojeman, the investigator in Boone’s office, clearly went beyond his duties as an investigator when applied his signature to the lies in his affidavit, drafted by Boone, and presented in support of the Search Warrant. The seizure warrant caused Heimlich’s wrongful indictment and trial. Ojeman clearly went beyond his duties when he, NOT the complainant Pettorino, sign it.
Attached as Exhibit
G
1)
The affidavit begins with “Your Affiant has spoken with
Eric Pettorino….employed as a real estate salesman”. Boone knew or should have
known from this very first statement that title to the money he sought to seize
belonged to the Broker (Heimlich) under which Pettorino was sponsored according
the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act.
2)
First sentence continues with “under the license of a
man by the name of Edmund Bryan Heimlich” the Plaintiff. Here, again, Boone
knew, or should have known, the title to the money he sought to seize belonged
to Plaintiff as the sponsoring broker by law of the Texas Real Estate Licensing
act.
3)
Second sentence states “Mr Pettorino further informed
your affiant that his contract with Mr Heimlich…”. Here Boone knew, or
should have known, the money he sought to seize was the subject of a civil, not
a criminal, dispute.
4)
“…provides that he pay Mr. Heimlich three hundred
dollars per month as a “Broker’s Management Charge…” indicating Boone knew
Pettorino had, or could have, contractual debt obligations to Heimlich.
5)
Second paragraph of the affidavit begins with “Mr.
Pettorino told your affiant that on August 25, 1993, he completed the sale of
some real estate from the Veterans Adminstration to a private buyer and
received, as commission, a United States Treasury check made payble to “Edmund
B. Heimlich C O Agent Cashier”. This is intentionally misleading. The check,
attached as Exhibit H, is
payable to Edmund B. Heimlich. The C O Agent Cashier is under Edmund B.
Heimlich’s name and part of a PO address for the Veterans Administration. It
refers to the VA as the “Agent Cashier”. The check, a copy of which Boone possessed,
was clearly payable to Edmund B. Heimlich, the Plaintiff, and NOT to the
complainant Pettorino for whom Boone was allegedly seizing the funds.
6)
This paragraph also states that Pettorino submitted the
check to Heimlich on August 25, 1993 and at the same time received a check
dated August 26, 1993. Here Boone acknowledges in the affidavit the request for
seizure is based on a post-dated check. Boone knew the penal code in effect at
that time precluded prosecution on post-dated checks.
7)
Affidavit states “Mr. Pettorino stated to Affiant that
he inquired of Edmund B. Heimlich to find what reason he had for stopping
payment on the check, but that Mr. Heimlich refused to give him any reason.”
This is heresay. Pettorino did not sign this affidavit and no such affidavit by
Pettorino has ever been produced. This is also false. Pettorino had a copy of
the stop-pay order and the affidavit even states the stop-pay order shows
“cover charge due”. A review of the contract shows that, in fact, a cover
charge was due from Pettorino as well as other potential charges. It is also
notable that there is no statement suggesting Heimlich made refusal to settle
his dispute with Pettorino.
8)
The fourth paragraph is most telling of all. It states:
“Affiant has reviewed the original check presented to the bank returned marked
“stop payment”, a copy of the “Broker and Salesperson Agreement (Independent
contractor)”, a receipt for Mr. Pettorino’s August Broker ‘s Management Charge”
and has found them to be consistent with Mr. Pettorino’s statements set forth
above.” Here again this is heresay as
Pettorino did not sign this or any other affidavit. And a cursory review of the
“Agreement” shows this to be patently false. The Agreement is a contract
drafted by attorneys working for the state and promulgated by a state agency,
The Texas Real Estate Commission, in accordance with the Texas Real Estate
Licensing Act and clearly states:
3(b) In no case shall Broker be personally liable to Salesperson for any fees not collected, nor shall Salesperson be liable to Broker for any fees not collected.
Heimlich, as Broker, never collected the
fees. Obviously; Boone’s actions prevented him from doing so.
3(c) The division and distribution of
earned fees as set out herein shall take place as soon as practicable after
collection and receipt of such fees. The parties agree that Broker is
authorized to deduct amounts due Broker from Salesperson from any fees payable
to Salesperson hereunder.
Broker, Heimlich, was blocked from ‘collection and
receipt of such fees’ by Boone’
3(d) All fees and other sums earned by or through the efforts of Salesperson shall be payable to and are and shall remain the sole and exclusive property of Broker, and Salesperson shall have not direct interest whatsoever in any such fees or the collection thereof and shall look solely to Broker for payment of sums due Salesperson under the terms of this Agreement.
Heimlich had legal titled to the funds
14(a) Neither party shall be liable to
the other for any commission not collected.
Heimlich had no debt to Pettorino therefore no theft
had occurred.
14(g) Broker may deduct any part or all past due charges, late charges, management fees coming due within the next 10 days, and expenses due Broker, from commissions payable to Salesperson and/or forfeit all or part of Salesperson’s Security Deposit.
Heimlich had a contractual right to collect any and
all charges coming due. Pettorino was able to avoid his obligations to
Heimlich, steal from Heimlich, with the aid of John Boone and the Harris County
District Attorney’s Office acting under color of law.
9)
This affidavit was submitted to, and signed by, the
Magistrate on September 1, 1993 based on dispute over check written just a few days
before on August 27, 1993. On that date Boone had in his possession a written
statement (titled ‘Memorandum’) he had requested from the bank. Dated August
31, 1993 it states “If payment had not stopped, the check No. 1088 payable to
Eric Pettorino whould have been honored on 08/26/93” signed by Betty
Kristoffersen of the Bank (see Memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit I).
Boone knew, as Kristoffersen latter testified, that if Pettorino could have cashed
the check on the 26th then likewise Heimlich could have withdrawn
the funds on the 26th which he surely would have done if his
intention had been theft which was alleged as the cause for the warrant to
seize the money. True and correct copy of trial transcript is attached hereto
as Exhibit J.
10) Not only had Heimlich NOT committed any theft; the affidavit states “affiant has obtained copies of the records of Bank Texas, N.A. ….”. Boone and Ojeman knew the account held sufficient funds to cover the check and therefore Heimlich was not even subject to penal code provisions for even a bad check charge.
FACTS OF LAW
It
is a Judicial fact that The Uniform Commercial Code and Texas Business and
Commerce Code, Section 4.403(a), was a valid and enforceable statue in the
State of Texas, on the days in question, entitled CUSTOMER’S RIGHT TO STOP
PAYMENT, and did read as follows:
(a) A customer may by order to his bank
stop payment of any item payable for his account but the order must be received
at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity
to act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to the item described
in Section 4.303.
AND;
That
on August 26, 1995, The Uniform Commercial Code and Texas Business and Commerce
Code, Section 3.409(a), was a valid and enforceable statute in the State of
Texas, entitled DRAFT NOT AN ASSIGNMENT,
and did read as follows:
(a)
A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds
in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not
liable on the instrument until he accepts it.
AND;
That
on August 26, 1995, The Uniform Commercial Code and Texas Business and Commerce
Code, Section 3.601(b), was a valid and enforceable statute in the State of
Texas, entitled DISCHARGE OF THE PARTIES,
and did read as follows:
(b)
Any party is also discharged from his liability on an instrument to another
party by any other act or agreement with such party which would discharge his
simple contract for the payment of money.
1. Article
1, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person o thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, unsupported by oath or affirmation.
2. Article 18.01(b) of the Tex CCP requires:
“A sworn affidavit
setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause shall be
filed in every instance in which a search warrant is requested. The affidavit
is public information if executed.”
4.13. A seizure warrant issued on the basis of a misleading presentation is a violation of Heimlich’s Constitutional Rights and is not protected by immunity defense (Burns v. Reed, 500 US 478 [991]). Boone’s legal advice to his investigator Ojeman is not protected by immunity defense (Kalina v Fletcher, 522 US 118 [1997]).
4.14. Boone presented this affidavit to a Magistrate, just 2 days after Boone had instructed Eric of the required 10-day demand period (which was the day after the stop-pay). Evidence Boone knew the law but chose to disregard it to ‘show Heimlich’. This was just 4 business days after the stop-payment order. This is evident by the attached Exhibit G copy of the warrant and affidavit with the contract attachment submitted to the Magistrate. It is apparent to any objective party reviewing the evidence that the Boone’s intention was to color, otherwise lawful conduct, as being sinister and improper.
4.15. The initial seizure via bank hold, at Boone’s instruction, was a seizure without warrant or affidavit in violation of Heimlich’s Constitutional Rights. Any reasonably objective attorney would have recognized the dispute between Heimlich and complainant as a civil, not a criminal, matter. As the Appellate Court pointed out, the seizure precluded Heimlich from settling this dispute, and/or satisfying the demands of Boone or Pettorino.
4.16. The seizure of property is a drastic action that should only be taken after a reasonable and objective investigation. A reasonably objective investigator would have taken a moment to check the property records. A reasonably objective Assistant District Attorney would have recognized Heimlich owned a home, in addition to owning a business, and had family living and owning homes in Houston. Heimlich’s office was well furnished with substantial value in office equipment, furniture and fixtures. These easily attainable facts show Boone had no reason to assume Heimlich would withdraw the money and leave the complainant without possibility remedy in the civil courts. Reasonably objective Assistant District Attorney would have allowed Heimlich an opportunity to settle his affairs with the complainant before blocking any means for Heimlich to do so.
4.17. Boone knew, or should have known by reasonably objective inquiry and observation, that Pettorino’s complaint was on a post-dated check. Exhibit C. . Failure to do so was intentional or unexcusable ignorance.
4.18. A reasonable and objective investigation would have noticed the stop pay was for "cover charge due" Exhibit K and recognized this was for the month due to start in 3 days. The contract between Pettorino and Heimlich clearly states Heimlich’s right to deduct charges due or coming due within the next 10 days Exhibit B. A reasonable and objective investigator would have read the contract and recognized this. Failure to do so was intentional or unexcusable ignorance.
4.19. A reasonable investigator would have asked Pettorino if his management fee (cover charge) had been previously deducted from commission checks that came in prior to the end of the month. This was easily observable by looking at the receipt Pettorino showed Boone as proof his August payment was paid Exhibit L. It shows a deduction from a commission check on July 27th for the August Management fee. Simple, basic, questioning would have revealed the Exhibits M & N showing this was customary practice between Heimlich and Pettorino. . Failure to do so was intentional or unexcusable ignorance.
4.20. Boone’s presentation of this affidavit to a Magistrate is a travesty. As an Assistant District Attorney he had a duty to be truthful and forthright to the Magistrate. Boone and Ojeman’s factual and legal misrepresentations, innuendoes, conclusory comments and opinions utilized to secure the indictment of Heimlich were clearly improper and illustrate that the prosecution of Heimlich was indeed malicious.
5.0
FACTS – II.
5.1. In his attempt to “get” Heimlich, Boone suborned Ojeman and together they crossed the line from their discretionary duties as investigator and prosecutor and commenced down a path of conduct that was so improper that it became actionable. Heimlich files this 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, in part, under Texas law as a tort action for Malicious Prosecution.
5.2. Heimlich filed his Motion to Set Aside and his attorney filed his Motion to Quash. Within three months Heimlich had presented the District Attorney’s office with Exhibit O proving Pettorino’s indebtedness to Heimlich in the minimum of $900. Funds for which Heimlich has never been paid. In arrogant disregard for the law, to cover their own mistakes, the District Attorney’s office persisted in the prosecution of Heimlich and, in the process, knowingly aided Pettorino in theft of services from Heimlich. In doing so Boone and the District Attorney’s office clearly crossed the line from their discretionary duties and commenced down a path of conduct that was so improper it became actionable.
5.3. Within three months of the seizure Pettorino and the Bank Officer gave sworn testimony that gave Boone and Harris County District Attorneys Office additional information showing the legally impossible nature of their charge against Heimlich. However; Boone and the Harris County District Attorneys office continued to withhold the funds from both Heimlich and, the alleged victim, Pettorino, for another 2 years while attempting to strong-arm Heimlich into releasing them from liability for their violations of his Constitutional Rights. In doing so Boone and the District Attorney’s office clearly crossed the line from their discretionary duties and commenced down a path of conduct that was so improper it became actionable.
5.4. Heimlich made repeated attempts to secure release, directly through his own motions, and through his attorney, so he could settle the civil dispute. The District Attorneys office ignored all attempts of reasonableness. Heimlich was already under arrest and bond. It is clearly reasonably objective that, had a release of the seized funds not resulted in settlement of the civil dispute, the District Attorney’s office could have proceeded with a charge against Heimlich. The District Attorney’s office stubbornly persisted in their violation of Heimlich’s Constitutional Rights and maintained their hold on the funds so as to maintain the illusion of a theft when they knew no theft by Heimlich had occurred. To the detriment of the alleged victim, Pettorino, as well as to Heimlich.
5.5. The Court set a hearing to determine ownership but at the request of the District Attorneys office canceled it (Exhibit P). Heimlich made written request to the Court for release of the money so he could settle with Pettorino in 1993 (Exhibit Q). Heimlich then filed a civil case against Pettorino and again made request for release of the money in 1995 (Exhibit R). Now requesting the funds be transferred to the civil court # 157 where dispute mediation had been schedule on the civil case. The District Attorneys office refused to allow it. Dispute mediation was scheduled but the District Attorneys office intervened and prevented it’s occurrence before a criminal trial.
5.6. At one point Heimlich had agreement with the Prosecutor to allow the funds to be released directly to Pettorino in exchange for dismissal of the charges against him. The District Attorney’s office cancelled the agreement when Heimlich would not agree to their demand that Heimlich release them from any liability for their actions. It is apparent to any objective party reviewing this evidence the District Attorney’s office was not acting out of concern for Pettorino as an alleged crime victim. Their only desire was to ‘show Heimlich’ they were above the law. The District Attorney’s office then orchestrated a sham trial to secure Heimlich’s conviction. The sham trial was an attempt to cover John Boone and Milton Ojeman’s violation of Heimlich Constitutional Rights and obstruct justice.
5.7. It is apparent to any objective party reviewing these events that the District Attorney’s office was to oppress Heimlich in order to suppress his ability to petition the government for redress. These actions illustrate that the prosecution of Heimlich was indeed malicious, was an abuse of process, and an obstruction of justice. Heimlich files this 42 U.S.C. 1985 claim, in part, under Texas law as a tort action for abuse of process.
6.0
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
6.1.
Heimlich
files this 42 U.S.C.1983 claim, in part, under Texas law as an action for
malicious prosecution.
6.2.
Malicious
prosecution claims require proof of the following elements:
i.
the
institution or continuation of proceedings against the party;
ii.
by
or at the insistence of the opposing party;
iii.
malice
in the commencement of the proceeding;
iv.
lack
of probable cause for the proceeding;
v.
termination
of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor; and
vi.
special
damages.
6.3.
Harris
County, through its agents, Boone and Ojeman, instituted and Prosecuted a
criminal action and investigation against Heimlich. But for Boone and Ojeman’s
conduct during the investigative stage of this proceeding and before the
Magistrate Heimlich would never have been indicted.
6.4.
Harris
County, through its agents, Boone and Ojeman, acted with malice towards
Heimlich. They acted with reckless disregard of the rights of Heimlich and in a
wanton and willful fashion. Their conduct was knowingly done and was
unreasonable under the circumstances. They were indifferent as to the injury
they were inflicting upon Heimlich
6.5.
No
probable cause existed for the prosecution of the criminal action against
Heimlich or the indictment of Heimlich.
6.6.
The
criminal case was terminated in Heimlich's favor. The Order of the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals will be binding in this case on this issue.
6.7.
The special injury
requirement for malicious prosecution must be in the form of some physical
interference with a patty's person or property in the form of an arrest,
attachment, injunction or sequestration. Attachment was made to Heimlich’s bank
account, his property was sequestered, and after Heimlich was indicted, he was
arrested and later confined for five months.
7.0
42 U.S.C.1983
7.1. As a result of their concerted unlawful and malicious prosecution of Heimlich, Defendants intentionally, or with deliberate indifference and callous disregard of Heimlich’s rights, deprived Heimlich of his right to equal protection of the laws and impeded the due process of justice, in violation of the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. & 1983.
7.2. Further, Defendants’ approval of investigator Ojeman’s and Boone’s seizure of Heimlich’s bank account constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. & 1983.
7.3. Acting under color of law and pursuant to official policy or a persistent and widespread practice, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom, Defendant DA Holmes and Assistant DA Rosenthal knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate indifference and callous disregard of Heimlich’s rights failed to instruct, supervise, control and discipline on a continuing basis Assistant DA Boone and Investigator Ojeman in their duties to refrain from unlawfully and maliciously harassing and prosecuting a citizen who was acting in accordance with his constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities.
7.4.
Acting under color of law and pursuant to official
policy or a persistent and widespread practice, which, although not authorized
by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as
to constitute a custom, Defendant DA Holmes and Assistant DA Rosenthal
knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate
indifference and callous disregard of Heimlichs’ rights, failed to instruct,
supervise, control and discipline on a continuing basis ADA Boone in his duties
to refrain from unlawfully and falsely arresting and imprisoning a citizen who
was acting in accordance with her constitutional and statutory rights,
privileges and immunities.
7.5.
Acting under color of
law and pursuant to official policy or a persistent and widespread practice,
which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is
so common and well settled as to constitute a custom, District Attorney Johnny
Holmes and Supervising Assistant District Attorney Rosenthal knowingly,
recklessly, or with deliberate indifference and callous disregard of Heimlich's
rights, failed to instruct, supervise, control and discipline on a continuing
basis Boone and/or Ojeman in their duties to refrain from unlawfully,
maliciously, wantonly and oppressively seizing the private property of
citizens.
Evidence
of these alleged customs and practices of the DA in Harris County is clearly
evident by the uncontovertable facts of law, evidence, and the transcript of
the trial of cause No. 674066 in the
248th District Criminal Court of Harris County.
8.0
ABUSE OF PROCESS
8.1
Heimlich files this 42
U.S.C.1985 claim, in part, under Texas law as an action for abuse of process.
8.2
Abuse of Process claims
require proof of the following elements:
i.
the use of process
ii.
the existence of an
ulterior motive
iii.
a misuse of the process
in question
iv.
injury or damage
resulting from defendant’s conduct
8.3 Heimlich seeks redress in this court on the ground that he has been denied, in the Courts of the State of Texas, and particularly in the District Court for the County of Harris, rights guaranteed and secured to him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which states:
8.4 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of Counsel for his defense.”
8.5 These rights are further remunerated in the Texas Constitution, Article 1 entitled “Bill of Rights”, Section 10. AND;
8.6 Article 2.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
“It is the duty of
the trial court, the attorney representing the accused, the attorney
representing the state and all peace officers to so conduct themselves as to
insure a fair trial for both the state and the defendant, not impair the
presumption of innocence, and at the same time afford the public the benefits
of a free press.”
8.7 Art. 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedures provides:
“It
shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special
prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. They shall not
suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of
the accused.”
9.0
CONSPIRACY
TITLE
42 U.S.C. 1985
9.1
Acting under color of
law and pursuant to official policy or a persistent and widespread practice, which,
although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom, Supervising Assistant
District Attorney Rosenthal knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate
indifference and callous disregard of Heimlich’s rights, conspired with Boone
and Ojeman to violate the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to
Heimlich by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of
Texas.
9.2
Acting under color of law and pursuant to official policy
or a persistent and widespread practice, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to
constitute a custom, DA Holmes and Supervising Assistant District Attorney
Rosenthal knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate indifference and callous
disregard of Heimlich’s rights, failed to instruct, supervise, control and
discipline on a continuing basis Boone and/or Ojeman in his duties to refrain from otherwise depriving Heimlich of his constitutional
and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities.
9.3
Beginning in 1993, and continuing through this day, in
the County of Harris, State of Texas, the defendants, in violation of Title 42
USC 1985(2), did conspire and agree between themselves and with other person or
persons, for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the
due course of justice in the State of Texas, and with intent to deny to
Heimlich Edmund Heimlich his rights under the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
9.4
In furtherance of the objective of said conspiracy, one
or more of said defendants did do or cause to be done the acts set forth in
this complaint and, in violation of Title 42, USC 1985, did thereby injure
Heimlich in his person and deprive him of having and exercising his rights and
privileges under the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
Constitution and laws of the State of Texas as set forth in this complaint to
Heimlich’s detriment in an amount within the jurisdictional limits of the
court.
9.5
Evidence of these alleged customs and practices of the
DA in Harris County is clearly evident by the uncontovertable facts of law,
evidence, and the transcript of the trial
of cause No. 674066 in the 248th District Criminal Court of Harris
County.
10.0
NEGLECT
TO PREVENT
TITLE
42 U.S.C. 1986
10.1
DA Holmes and Assistant
District Attorney Rosenthal knew or, had they diligently exercised his duties
to 'instruct, supervise, control, and discipline on a continuing basis, should
have known that the wrongs conspired to be done, as heretofore alleged, were
about to be committed. DA Holmes and Supervising Assistant District Attorney
Rosenthal had power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of said
wrongs, could have done so by reasonable diligence, and knowingly, recklessly,
or with deliberate indifference and callous disregard of Heimlich’s rights
failed or refused to do so. Furthermore, Rosenthal, directly or indirectly,
under color of law, approved or ratified the unlawful, deliberate, malicious, reckless,
and wanton conduct of Boone and Ojeman heretofore described.
10.2
Because making and
securing warrants for the seizure of property is a crucial component in the
daily activities of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office ("HCDA
OFFICE"), the need for training in these areas is obvious. On information
and belief, DA Holmes and Supervising Assistant District Attorney Rosenthal
gave little or no direction relating to the proper use of affidavits and the
issuance of warrants. Prosecutors and Investigators were discouraged from
seeking out supplementary training courses; background checks of prospective
prosecutors and investigators were deficient; discipline was handed out
haphazardly, inconsistently, and infrequently; there had been requests to
improve training and organization; and there were warnings that if the
instruction, training, supervision, and discipline situation did not improve,
the consequences would be serious.
10.3
As the ‘number two man’
in the District Attorney’s office the actions or failures to act, set forth in
¶¶ 4.1-4.20 and 5.1-5.6 above, were personal because he has the responsibility
to prevent the abuses described herein.
10.4 Further, inadequate training in these areas is almost certain to result in violations of constitutional rights and has caused widespread, persistent instances of misconduct and incompetence on the part of HCDA personnel. As a result, authorization of and adoption of an inadequate training program and procedures in these areas amounts to a deliberate indifference on the part of DA Holmes and Assistant District Attorney Rosenthal to the safety of citizens and the people with whom the HCDA personnel come into contact.
10.5
In spite of the fact that defendants knew, or should
have known, of the fact that this pattern of conduct was being carried out by
their agents and employees, the Harris County District Attorney’s office,
defendant Johnny Holmes, and the other defendants, have taken no step or effort
to order a halt to this course of conduct, to make redress to these Heimlichs
or other citizens injured thereby, or to take any disciplinary action whatever
against any of their employees or agents.
10.6
Defendants have in fact praised themselves and
commended their agents and employees. Such praise having the effect of encouraging
their agents and employees to continue this pattern of conduct.
10.7
As a result of the actions of the defendants Heimlich
was subjected to an assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment,
illegal search and seizure, excessive use of force, deprivation of liberty and
property, invasion of privacy , and serious mental anguish and emotional pain
and suffering. Defendant County, as a matter of policy and practice, has failed
to properly train it’s police officers and assistant district attorneys,
including the defendants, with respect to constitutional, statutory, and
departmental limits of their authority.
10.8
Defendant State of Texas, as a matter of policy and
practice, has failed to properly train its judicial officers and agents of the
courts.
Evidence
of these alleged customs and practices of the DA in Harris County is clearly
evident by the uncontovertable facts of law, evidence, and the transcript of
the trial of cause No. 674066 in the
248th District Criminal Court of Harris County.
11.0
SELECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY PROSECUTION
11.1 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the filing of this charge against Mr. Heimlich constitutes selective and discriminatory enforcement of and prosecution under the penal law of the state of Texas. The act of theft for which he was charged was nothing more than placing a stop pay on a check. The very act for which Mr. Heimlich has been criminally charged is engaged in on a repeated and daily basis throughout the city of Houston to the knowledge of the city’s law enforcement agencies and prosecutorial departments. However; no other criminal prosecutions have been undertaken, save this one.
11.2
Arbitrary, selective and discriminatory enforcement or
prosecution under the penal law is an unconstitutional abridgment of an
accused’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal
protection under the laws.
11.3
The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevent the State from singling out a person or class of
persons for purposeful and intentional prosecution in bad faith.
11.4
Here, the prosecution is improperly and
unconstitutionally selectively, arbitrarily and invidiously discriminating
between Mr. Heimlich and those hordes of others committing, on a daily basis,
the very act for which Mr. Heimlich has been criminally charged. The decision
to charge Mr. Heimlich was wholly without legal foundation.
11.5
The instant case is a palpable and classic instance
of selective and discriminatory enforcement of and prosecution under the laws.
12.0
MALICE AND IMPROPER MOTIVE
12.1
It is apparent
to any objective party reviewing the following events that the District
Attorney’s office motive was to oppress Heimlich in order to punish him form his
calls to the very agencies citizens expect are there to protect us. It is
ludicrous to think a thief, or person with bad intent, would call the highest
law enforcement agency in the nation, the Department of Justice, for advice
while in the commission of a felony. Heimlichs’ request for protection from the
unlawful acts of Boone only served to make him a target of official oppression.
The purpose, the motive, behind Defendants actions was to suppress Heimlich’s
ability to petition the government for redress. Defendant’s have succeeding in
doing so for the past seven (7) years. These actions illustrate that the
seizure of Heimlich’s property and the indictment and prosecution that followed
was indeed malicious and the motive improper.
12.2
Further; Harris
County, by and through DA Holmes, Assistant District Attorney Rosenthal, ADA
John Boone, and Investigator Ojeman individually, have with specific malicious
intent, libeled and persecuted Heimlich for attempting to petition the
government for change and protest their mistreatment.
12.3
This
persecution has continued through this day with the aid of the State of Texas
and gives cause for Heimlich to name the State of Texas as Defendant.
12.4
During
the Christmas holiday Heimlich was watching Channel 11 KHOU, a major television
broadcaster in the Houston, Texas region. The leading story was the “Texas Sex
Offenders Database” mandated by Texas House Bill 1176 that allows citizens to
utilize the internet to search conviction records held by the Texas Department
of Public Safety. Heimlich went to the channel 11 website and directed,
followed the links to the Texas Department of Public Safety, and for $3.50
found himself listed as a convicted felon. This is over 9 months after the
Court of Appeals acquitted him of the unjust charges to which he had been
subjected to over 7 years before. Any employer, any prospective business
partner, any prospective mate can, for $3.50 be told by whom that assume to be
a legitimate authority, that Heimlich is a convicted felon. Heimlich joins the
State of Texas as Defendant in the defamation of his character. See Exhibit S.
12.5
This conduct
has caused much of the Heimlichs’ mental anguish.
12.6 For the reasons expressed in ¶¶ above, Defendants’ conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress to Heimlich and request exemplary and punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages and all further relief available.
13.0
DAMAGES
13.1 Plaitiff Heimlich incorporates the foregoing and incorporates same by reference herein.
13.2 The pattern of activity of the Defendants was intended to cause Heimlich economic and emotional distress. Defendants conduct was extreme and outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. In particular, the Defendant’s conduct was outrageous because of the misuse of public trust and public funds in their activities.
13.3 Heimlich was accused by lies and convicted with false testimony of criminal intent, has had his property searched and seized, his business and professional career maligned and destroyed, his reputation impugned irrevocably. In particular, the Defendant’s conduct was the direct and proximate cause of severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair, and public humiliation.
13.4 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions Heimlich suffered severe humiliation, embarrassment, fear, frustration and general intense mental anguish, and in all reasonable likelihood will continue to do so for a long time into the future and for the balance of his natural life.
13.5 As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid acts of the defendants, and each of them, Edmund Heimlich suffered tremendous emotional turmoil and great mental anguish, from then until now, and he will continue so to suffer in the future; and he has lost and will in the future lose large sums of money by reason of having been greatly humiliated and held up to public scorn and derision as a result of the foregoing acts f the defendants.
13.6 Heimlich was forced to incur substantial obligations for attorney’s fees, court reporter’s fees, investigation expenses, and other expenses in the defense of himself against the unfounded and unwarranted prosecution by the defendants, which have been a serious burden to him.
13.7
All of the foregoing actions and failures to act by
Defendants have resulted in serious emotional distress to Heimlich in
connection with the deprivation of his constitutional and statutory rights
guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to; the Constitution of the United States and protected by 42 U.S.C. §1983,
42 U.S.C. §1985, and 42 U.S.C. §1986.
13.8 Heimlich also seeks an award of special damages that, as a proximate result of the acts of defendants, Heimlich suffered damages to his property and business in the course of his arrest and prosecution amounting to unspecified damages and that Heimlich, by the lose of his professional license and reputation suffered loss of earnings amounting to unspecified damages.
13.9 Heimlich sustained injuries and as a result of his injuries he should be compensated for each and all of the following elements of damage, both in the past and those which in reasonable probability he will sustain into the future:
a.
Physical pain and mental anguish;
b.
Emotional distress;
c.
Shame and embarrassment;
d.
Humiliation;
e.
Lost business and professional reputation;
f.
Lost wages, benefits, profits and economic
opportunities;
g.
Medical expenses;
h.
Lost personal financial resources; and
i.
Unnecessary legal fees for criminal defense.
13.10
Additionally, Heimlich
requests that this Court award his reasonable and necessary attorney's fees
incurred in the investigating, filing and prosecution of this suit as permitted
by 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
13.11
Plaintiff demands
judgment against all Defendants jointly and severally, for the compensatory
damages listed above and further demand judgment against each of said
Defendants jointly and severally, for punitive damages in the amount of $ 5
million.
13.12
The law also entitles
Plaintiffs to recover pre-judgment interest on the amount outstanding and post
judgment interest on any judgment at the highest rate allowed by law.
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury to hear the facts of his case.
14.0
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court order Defendants, The State of
Texas, Harris County, District Attorney Johnny Holmes, Assistant Attorney Charles
“Chuck” Rosenthal, Assistant District Attorney John Boone, and Investigator
Milton Ojeman to appear and answer in this case, and that, upon final hearing,
Plaintiffs have judgment against Defendants for the following relief:
(1) Actual damages in an amount exceeding the minimum
jurisdictional limits of this Court;
(2) Special damages, as set forth in this complaint, in an
amount exceeding the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court;
(3) Pre-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by
law;
(4) Punitive damages in an amount exceeding the minimum
jurisdictional limits of this Court;
(5) Exemplary damages in an amount exceeding the minimum
jurisdictional limits of this Court;
(6) All costs of Court;
(7) Post-judgment interest at the maximum legal rate from the date of judgment until paid;
(8) Attorneys' fees; and
(9) Such other and further relief, at law and in equity,
to which Plaintiffs may show themselves justly entitled.
Respectfully
Submitted;