MOTION TO PUBLISH

Prelude to Unpublished Opinion

MOTION TO PUBLISH

OPINION OF THE 14^TH COURT OF APPEALS

(header and formalities excluded)

Pursuant Penal Code Ann. Sec 38.18, as interpreted by the 14th Appellate Court,
the Texas Bill of Rights is abolished, the Texas Legislature is powerless,
and the Laws of the State void whenever a public official, acting under color of law,
shall so decide

4. The opinion in this case meets the standards for publication in Tex.R.App. P. 90(d) because;

It establishes a new rule of law. In effect it states that any public official has authority to disregard the U.S. Constitution, The Texas Constitution and all other laws of the State of Texas if they should in anyway "interfere with the duties of a public official". (Causing one to wonder if they should be termed "public" official. Maybe "Master" would be more appropriate). This opinion states that the "public official", even if only a precinct Constable, has authority to determine those duties even if his determination of his duties are in total opposition to the Law established by the State Legislature, and/or the Texas Constitution, and/or the US Constitution.

It alters or modifies an existing rule. It authorizes public officials to disregard Rule 637, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribing the manner in which a judgment writ may be executed. And thus eliminates provisions against Ex Post Facto or Retroactive Laws. It provides Constables with authority to establish laws arbitrarily.

It alters, modifies, and eliminates existing law. Specifically it eliminates Article 1, Section 19:

"DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY, ETC.; DUE COURSE OF LAW"; "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disenfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land". (Assuming Rule 637 is "the due course of the law of the land")

AND;

Article 1, Section 29, of the Texas Constitution, entitled "PROVISIONS OF BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT; TO REMAIN FOREVER INVIOLATE" states; "To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this "Bill of Rights" is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions shall be void".

Pursuant Penal Code Ann. Sec 38.18, as interpreted by the 14th Appellate Court, the Texas Bill of Rights is abolished, the Texas Legislature is powerless, and the Laws of the State void whenever a public official, acting under color of law, shall so decide. Again; The opinion has determined the authority of a lone Deputy Constable discretion of his duty is superior to that of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Legislators.

It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest in the equal rights of all free men, equality under the law, (Texas Constitution Bill of Rights Section 3 and Section 9) and the question of whether we are a nation of men or a nation of law. According to the opinion of the 14th Court of Appeals we are a nation of men in that public officials are exempt from responsibility to respect the authority of the U.S. Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and other laws of the State. In short; Texas has been declared a Police State.

It is an obvious criticism of both the United States and Texas Bill of Rights. It is a criticism of the defenses provided by the Texas Legislators in the Tex. Penal Code. Among others; Section 9.31 (c) "the use of force to resist an arrest or search is justified: (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's use or attempted use of greater force than necessary."

It resolves an apparent conflict of authority in that public officials in law enforcement are no longer required to respect the authority of the Texas Legislators when it "interferes" or "impedes" their duties in whatever manner the public official may determine that duty to be.

5. For these reasons, Edmund B. Heimlich, Appellant, asks the court to grant this motion and publish the opinion of the court of appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

MOTION WAS DENIED

FOLLOWING IS THE OPINION (with notes)

Affirmed and Opinion flied November 30, 1995.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-93-01142-CR

EDMUND BRYAN HEIMLICH, Appellant

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal From the County Criminal Court at Law No.9

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No.9308270

OPINION

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense of interfering with the duties of a public servant. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.18.1 He was convicted and the jury assessed punishment at ten days confinement in the Harris County jail and a $500 fine. In two points of error, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

The crime for which appellant was convicted was committed before September 1, 1994, the effective date of the revised penal code. See Acts 1993, 73rd leg., Ch. 900, § 1.18(b). Therefore, all references to the penal code are to the code in effect at the time the crime was committed.

Harris County Deputy Constable Ernest Godfrey was assigned to serve a writ of execution against Chasewest Corporation. David Ross was listed as the plaintiff on the writ. Ross had secured the writ pursuant to a judgment that he had been awarded against Chasewest Corporation in the amount of $415.

Deputy Godfrey first sent a demand letter to appellant requesting that he pay the judgment. (TAPE RECORDING PRESENTED AT TRIAL PROVES HE NEVER ASKED FOR CASH PAYMENT AS REQUIRED BY LAW) When he received no response, Godfrey phoned appellant and informed him of the outstanding judgment against Chasewest Corporation. AppelLant stated that he had sold Chasewest and all of its assets.

When Godfrey informed Ross that appellant had sold all of the assets of Chasewest, Ross advised Godfrey that he and appellant had purchased a computer in the name of Chasewest. Ross told Godfrey that he believed the computer was still in appellant's possession. Ross provided Godfrey with the receipt for the computer stating that it was purchased by Chasewest Corporation. (RECIEPT SHOWED THE COMPUTER TO BE MY PERSONAL PROPERTY, NOT THAT OF EITHER CHASEWEST OR CHOICE REALTY - THIS WAS ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE AND PART OF THE RECORD IGNORED BY THE APPELLATE COURT) Ross told Godfrey he wanted to seize the computer in satisfaction of the judgment.

Ross accompanied Godfrey to Chasewest in an attempt to execute the writ. When they arrived at the address listed for Chasewest. They found that the name on the door had been changed to Choice Realty. (FAILED TO MENTION THE EVIDENCE ALSO SHOWED IT WAS A BUSINESS IN A DIFFERENT LOCATION FROM CHASEWEST - EVIDENCE ENTERED AND IGNORED BY APPELLATE COURT) The two men went into the office and appellant and another man standing at a desk (WHO TESTIFIED AT TRIAL - HIS TESTIMONY IS IGNORED BY APPELLATE COURT). Godtfey approached appellant, showed him his identification, and demanded payment of the judgment. (TAPE RECORDING OF EVENT, ENTERED AS EVIDENCE AT TRAIL, PROVES HE NEVER ASKED FOR CASH PAYMENT OR DESIGNATION OF PROPERTY) Appellant stated he no longer owned Chasewest or any of its assets. (AND CALLED HIS ATTORNEY ON ANOTHER FLOOR OF BUILDING, AND ASKED GODFREY TO WAIT FOR ATTORNEY TO ARRIVE - EVIDENCE ENTERED AT TRIAL AND IGNORED BY APPELLATE COURT)

Godfrey then explained to appellant that he needed to inspect the serial number on the computer, which had been identified by Ross as the one purchased by Chasewest. As Godfrey approached the computer. appellant moved the computer under his desk and shoved Godfrey out of the way. Godfrey made a second attempt to inspect the computer, but appellant shoved him again. (GODFREY HIMSELF TESTIFIED I DID NOT PUSH HIM. WITNESS TESTIFIED I DID NOT PUSH HIM. I COULD NOT PUSH HIM. I HAD THE PHONE IN MY HAND CALLING THE POLICE TO REPORT GODFREY'S ASSAULT. I TESTIFIED I DID NOT PUSH HIM. RECORDING PROVES I DID NOT, AND COULD NOT, HAVE PUSHED HIM. ONLY PERSON TESTIFYING I PUSHED GODFREY WAS JUDGMENT DEBTOR. APPELLATE COURT CHOOSE PERJURED TESTIMONY OF ONE OVER 3 OTHERS.)

In two points of error, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for interference with the duties of a public servant. Specifically, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient because Godfrey did not have any legal authority to be on appellant's business premises and because Godfrey failed to comply with the rules of procedure governing the levying of property.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence the appellate court will look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgrnent. Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tex. Grim. App. 1993). (TRANSLATION - WE IGNORE CONSTITUTION PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEIZURE, VIOLATION OF LAW BY POLICE, IGNORE TRIAL ERRORS, SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE, LOADED JURY CHARGE. WHATEVER IT TAKES TO UPHOLD CONVICTION) In so doing, the appellate court is to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jacksotz V. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Ransom V. State, 789 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) cen. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3255(1990).

The elements of the offense are (1) that an individual intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, (2) interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with a peflce officer, (3) who is performing one of his Lawfally assigned duties. Tsx. PENAL CODE ANN. * 38.18. rerzz£,nbered by Acts 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 12. § 2(26), eff. September 6, 1990 (current Version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15).

The evidence in the record is sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense. Godfrey was performing one of his lawfully assigned duties, ie., the execution of a writ. (WRONG - CASH WAS PAID TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT. WHAT GODFREY WAS DOING WAS ATTEMPTING THEFT) See TEX. C6DE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.13. In attempt to prevent Godfrey from completing his task (VIOLATION OF 4^TH AMENDMENT, THEFT), appellant intentionally moved the computer away from Godfrey. Further, appellant physically shoved Godfrey twice to prevent him from checking the serial number on the computer. (AGAIN - IGNORE TESTIMONY OF 3, INCLUDING GODFREY, TO UPHOLD AN UNJUST VERDICT)

Appellant argues, however, that he could not have interfered with Godfrey's duties because Godfrey did not have authority to execute the writ because Chasewest no longer operated at that address. Although we are unable to find any authority that interprets section 38.18. Arguments analogous to those urged by appellant have been held inadequate to avoid convictions for resisting arrest. In State V. Mayorga. 901 S.W.2d 943,

945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), the court stated:
Several states have eliminated either by statute or by judicial
decision the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest.
This reflects a growing realization that the use of self-help to
prevent an unlawful arrest presents too great a threat to the
safety of individuals and society to be sanctioned. The line
between an illegal and legal arrest is too fine to be determined
in a street confrontation; it is a question to be decided by the
courts. By limiting the common law right to resist an unlawful
arrest, the legislature has not limited the remedies available
to the person arrested. He or she may still take advantage of
the right to bond, to appointed counsel if indigent, to prompt
arraignment and determination of probable cause, to the
exclusionary rule and to civil remedies against the offending
policeman.

(NOW THIS IS REALLY STRETCHING IT. (1) THERE WAS NO ARREST BEING MADE. TEXAS LAW PROVIDES FOR DEFENSE OF PROPERTY:

The Laws of the State of Texas have attempted to more specifically provide for the preservation of the rights specified in the Constitution through it’s penal code, Section 9.31, entitled "Protection of Persons", which states;

(c) The use of force to resist an arrest or search is justified:

(1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer’s use or attempted use of greater force than necessary.

The Appellate Court ignores Texas Law, turns to Law of other States, to uphold unjust

Conviction)

The same rationale applies to an offense under section 38.18. Whether the property on which Godfrey was levying execution belonged to Chasewest Corporation is a matter to be determined by the courts. Appellant's attempt to challenge the validity of the writ of execution through use of physical force was a violation of section 38.18 regardless of whether the writ was factually sufficient. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a ratinal trier of fact could have found all of the essential elements of the offense (SURE, WITH ALL THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS SUPPRESSED AND A LOADED JURY CHARGE… SEE MY APPELLATE BRIEF (rather than that of the Court Appointed Attorney) FOR ALL THE OTHER TRIAL ERRORS NOT MENTIONED). Appellant's first and second points of error are overruled

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed November 30. 1995.

Panel consists of Justices Lee, Hudson and Edelman. (Justice Hudson not participating).

Do not publish - TEX. R. App P.90.