The American Bill of Rights, to which United States
Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan was so devoted, is one of the supreme
achievements of the human spirit. In
ten concise paragraphs, it encapsulates most of the basic rights and freedoms
that most of the world now regards as
the basis of individual liberty and human dignity.[2] But Justice Brennan, for one, never forgot
that every American had even more protection from government oppression. Ever mindful of his roots as a state judge
(with stints on the New Jersey trial, appellate and supreme court benches ), he
urged the bench and bar to rely on state bills of rights as well as the federal
one.[3] He recognized that
state constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.
The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not
be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law — for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.[4]
Most state bills of rights are longer than the first
ten amendments, and thus they contain rights and guarantees not found in the
federal constitution. The most
widespread and important of these unique state provisions is probably the
guarantee of a right of access to the courts to obtain a remedy for
injury. It is one of the oldest of
Anglo-American rights, rooted in Magna Carta[5]
and nourished in the English struggle for individual liberty and conscience
rights.[6] Today, it expressly or implicitly appears in
forty state constitutions.[7]
While there are thirty-two different versions[8]
among the forty states, there are two
major variants. Ten states use
language devised in the seventeenth
century by Sir Edward Coke.[9]
Their constitutions provide something like this:
That every person for every injury done him in his
goods, land or person, ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the
land and ought to have justice and right for the injury done to him freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according
to the law of the land.
Twenty-eight
states use a more compact form,[10]
reading something like this:
That all courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
the due course of the law.
Today,
these traditional words are invoked to challenge procedural impediments to
judicial access or to block substantive modifications to established causes of
action or remedies. In the last quarter century alone, state supreme courts
have relied on the right to a remedy to strike down laws that lacked discovery
rule exceptions to a time bar on bringing suit,[11]
allowed limitations to run against minor plaintiffs,[12]
or interposed terms of repose on claims against architects and builders,[13]
engineers,[14] suppliers[15]
and manufacturers.[16]
Repose statutes have also been invalidated that limited the time to bring
certain types of claims, such as workers’ compensation[17]
or hazardous material exposure.[18] Courts have also struck down laws that
granted sovereign immunity to municipalities for proprietary functions,[19] permitted defamers to retract and avoid
liability,[20] and
prevented guests from suing automobile drivers for ordinary negligence.[21] In the medical malpractice area, courts have
knocked down statutes capping non-economic damages for medical malpractice
victims[22]
and requiring medical malpractice claims to be screened by experts before
filing.[23] Finally, courts have used the provision to
open judicial proceedings to the public,[24]
including juvenile hearings,[25]
to forbid using filing fees for general
state revenue,[26] and to
proscribe the payment of penalties or
fines as a condition for challenging
them in court.[27]
These holdings demonstrate the significance of the
remedy guarantee. But they do not establish the parameters of its
application, because during the same quarter century, other courts in other
jurisdictions (or sometimes even the same courts in the same jurisdiction) have
upheld each of these types of laws against a remedies challenge.[28]
As one judge has aptly concluded: “In some states, [the right to a remedy] is
second only to the due process clause in importance; while in other states, it
is little more than an interesting historical relic.”[29]
These disparate results are essentially
inexplicable. They cannot be harmonized
by reliance on textual distinctions among the states. There is no correlation between the words of a particular
guarantee and how expansively the courts of that state have applied it.[30] Nor
can these different outcomes be explained by historical, social,
political or cultural variations between the states.[31] In each section of the country, whether the
constitution is old or new, the judges elected or appointed, or the political
culture traditional or progressive, some state courts defer unhesitatingly to legislative choices, while others
routinely strike down any statutes that impede access to the courts or impair
recovery under traditional theories.[32] Finally, these distinctions cannot be
explained by divergent intentions among the particular framers and ratifiers of
the individual state constitutions. In most states, there is almost no
historical record to explain what the framers and ratifiers thought the
provision would accomplish.[33] More often than not, such provisions
were adopted without a word of debate
or a dissenting vote,[34]
while in many others there was but a cursory
modification before approval.[35] The occasional nugget in the framers’ debate[36]
or in complementary constitutional provisions[37]
is definitely the exception, not the rule.
An obvious explanation for such disparities is the absence
of a corresponding guarantee in the United States Constitution. Not only do states lack the benefit of
federal interpretation, but they also lack the intensive scholarship and
focused public debate that has helped develop and refine our federal rights. To be sure, more treatises and law journals
are addressing the right to a remedy than ever before, and that is all to the
good. But like the dog’s bark in the
Sherlock Holmes story “The Adventure of Silver Blaze” by Arthur Conan
Doyle, the real significance is what is
not there. There are no right to a
remedy chairs at any law school. No
interest groups solicit funds to support or oppose a wider acceptance of their
favored interpretation of the provision.
I have never located a legal symposium devoted to the guarantee, or even
a journal article followed by replies or comments. I suspect that no one has ever been tenured at an accredited law
school based on remedies research. The
states can’t even agree on nomenclature: I have found eight different names for
the guarantee in cases and convention debates.[38] The American legal community would never
have ignored a federal constitutional right of even remotely comparable
importance.
Since that the United States Supreme Court is unlikely
to recognize a remedy guarantee within federal due process,[39]
it seems that state litigants and state courts are on their own. In my view,
state courts should welcome this opportunity.
If we are truly worthy of Justice Brennan’s confidence in state courts
as equal partners in defining basic rights and responsibilities, then the bench
and bar should be able to make the right to a remedy more than a wild card in
the creative litigator’s deck. If we
can’t tell precisely why the framers in Texas included this clause while those
in New York did not, we can nevertheless discover why English reformers created
the guarantee, why American patriots preserved it, and how its purpose can be
fulfilled today. Within each
jurisdiction, the courts should articulate a sufficiently coherent doctrine to
allow for the guarantee to be applied consistently and predictably. If two states develop divergent doctrines,
each state’s courts should be able to say why: either one state is right and
the other wrong, or some legitimate distinction permits both states to be
right.
If state courts are equal to this task, then
independent state constitutional jurisprudence is on solid grounds. If in interpreting other constitutional
guarantees, such courts happen to differ with federal precedent about
corresponding rights, such divergence is defensible and perhaps desirable. But if state courts cannot make any sense
out of their most important unique guarantee, then maybe a “lockstep” approach
is the most practical, if not the most principled, method of interpreting those
rights found in both state and federal constitutions.
I. Origins of the Right to a Remedy
To understand the right to a remedy, most states look
first to the guarantee’s origin and development in England. Judges have long been impressed by its
pedigree, dating from 1215 and the Great Charter on the field at Runnymede and
confirmed in 1225 as Chapter 29 of the “final version” of Magna Carta.[40] But the modern significance of the right to
a remedy began in 1641, when Sir Edward Coke’s Second Part of the Institutes
of the Laws of England was posthumously published.[41] Coke described Chapter 29 of Magna Carta as
a “roote” from which “many fruitfull branches of the law of England have
sprung.”[42]
One such branch was the protection of individuals’ rights from official acts of
oppression, the precursor to modern due process. Coke then moved to “the
rights of subjects in their private relations with one another,”[43]
where he gave this gloss on Magna Carta:
[E]very
Subject of this Realm, for Injury done to him in goods, lands, or person, by
any other Subject, Ecclesiastical or Temporal whatever he be, without
exception, may take his remedy by the Course of the Law, and have Justice and
Right for the injury done him, freely without Sale, fully without any
denyal, and speedily without delay; for Justice must have three Qualities: it
must be . . . free; for nothing is more odious than Justice [let] to sale; . .
. full, for justice ought not to limp, or be granted piece-meal, and . . .
speedily: Delay is a kind of
Denyal: And when all these meet, it is both Justice and Right.[44]
Much of this language survives intact as the remedies
guarantees of some states.[45]
During the next century, Sir William Blackstone
described the right to a remedy as one of the critical means through which a
civilized society served its principal aim _ the preservation of an individual’s absolute rights
to life, liberty, and property.[46] In his Commentaries on the Laws of
England,[47] first
published in Oxford between 1765 and
1769, Blackstone divided the rights of persons into two categories. The three absolute rights of personal
security, personal liberty, and property existed in a state of nature.[48] Other rights were merely relative, arising
only because men live in society and have relationships with other people.[49] Absolute rights could not be protected
simply by declaratory law; individuals required means of vindicating them.
But in vain would these [absolute] rights be declared, ascertained, and
protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no
other method to secure their actual enjoyment.
It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights
of the subject, which serve principally as outworks or barriers to protect and
maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property.[50]
The right to a remedy was one of the five subordinate
rights through which society vindicated its primary task of protecting the
absolute rights of men,[51]
and it encompassed both the substance of the law and the procedures through
which courts applied that law.[52] Thus, once a person was injured, the
right to an “adequate remedy” immediately attached, though judicial process
might be necessary to ascertain the exact parameters of that right.[53] The right to a remedy dictated that common
law courts must be courts of general jurisdiction, open to hear any and all
cases involving injury to individual rights, “[f]or it is a settled and
invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when withheld
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”[54] Thus when Blackstone quoted Coke’s dictum
that justice be granted fully and without delay, he was concerned not merely
with the physical availability of judicial process, but with the substantive
opportunity to assert claims to protect absolute rights.[55]
Coke nor Blackstone would have empowered judicial
officers to protect rights against all government intrusion. In their time, no one accorded “power” to
the courts to strike down a legislative
action, Bonham’s case (whatever it means) notwithstanding.[56] As Blackstone stated:
[Parliament] being the highest and greatest court,
over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a
misgovernment should any way fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are
left without all manner of remedy.[57]
Thus Blackstone clearly saw the remedies guarantee
only as a check on royal abuse of power, not parliamentary excess.
Unlike Coke and Blackstone, the revolting American
colonists saw both Crown and Parliament as oppressors.[58] Parliamentary initiatives during the 1760s
and 1770s convinced the colonists that the informal constitution securing
English rights against royal infringement was inadequate protection against all
possibilities of government oppression.
When independence was declared, some of the new American states began
adopting formal written constitutions to give structure to their new
governments and to give added security to the most fundamental rights. As
Gordon Wood notes, they recognized that laws protecting their basic freedoms
must be of “a nature more sacred than those which established a turnpike road.”[1]
By the end of 1776, two states had adopted
constitutions guaranteeing the right to a remedy.[2] Four more
states[3]
adopted the right before the federal Constitution was ratified, as did all
three new states that joined the union before 1800.[4]
In the absence of any surviving debate or discussion
from the adoption of these provisions, our best opportunity to discover how the
early framers intended to adapt the wisdom of Coke and Blackstone to the
American experience comes from early judicial interpretations of the right. If
the framers really intended to place a constitutional shield around the common
law, that notion should appear in opinions applying the guarantee.[5]
II. Early Interpretations
The first case I have found that mentions the remedies
guarantee of a state constitution was decided in 1814. Upholding a Massachusetts law that abolished
the common law right of landowners to sue mill owners for flooding,
substituting a payments schedule instead, the Supreme Judicial Court, reasoned:
If it should be said that the legislature itself has
not the constitutional authority to deprive a citizen of a remedy for a wrong
actually done to him, the answer is obvious, that they have a right to
substitute one process for another. . .[6]
Early nineteenth century courts invariably recognized
an adequate substitute as a defense to a remedies attack,[7]
even if the substituted remedy was “less convenient” or “more tardy and
difficult.”[8]
The remedies guarantee was first mentioned in an
opinion striking down a law in 1821.
The Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee relied on several federal
and state constitutional grounds to invalidate a statute providing a two-year
moratorium on executing on a judgment for debt unless the creditor agreed to
accept the notes of certain banks in satisfaction. The Court noted that “[i]n
Magna Charta this [the remedies] restriction is upon royal power; in our
country it is upon legislative and all other power.”[9] But based on Sullivan’s commentaries on
Coke, the Court read the right to a remedy as protecting only “original and
judicial process;”[10]
that is, “the mean whereby we may attain the end” of justice, or law.[11]
Thus, where “the law, operating on the contract when first made, held out to
the creditor the promise of immediate execution after judgment,”[12]
the new statute for it violated the right to a remedy.
In reviewing
statutes, nineteenth-century courts often applied the remedies clause
interchangeably with federal and state impairment of obligation of contracts
clauses, federal and state due process or due course guarantees, and federal
and state prohibitions against ex post facto or retroactive laws.[13] Debtor protection laws were struck down in
this scattershot manner on several occasions before the Civil War, with the
opinions not articulating the extent to which the remedies clause contributed
to the end results.[14]
The first case to strike down a government action
based solely on the remedies clause again came from Tennessee, decided in 1835.[15]
The action condemned was not a law, but a justice-of-the-peace court rule
requiring all motions for new trial to be made on the first Saturday after
trial. Because “[i]t is the business of
the courts to be open, where right and justice shall be administered,” the rule
had to yield to the constitution.[16] Later, several state courts voided laws that
taxed access to the courts in one way or another beyond what was needed to
support the judicial machinery.[17]
The first case I have found that struck down a statute
primarily on the basis of the remedies clause did not come until 1862, when the
Supreme Court of Minnesota struck down a law denying access to the courts of
the state to anyone “aiding the Rebellion.”
After expounding their support for the Union cause, the justices
observed that “in the end all must regard as a matter of pride and
gratification, that in this state no one, not even the worst of felons, can be
denied the right to simple justice.”[18]
Yet even these modest holdings were not without
controversy. When the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in 1859 relied in part on the remedies clause to strike down a law giving
a mortgagor six months to answer a foreclosure complaint, one justice
vigorously dissented, characterizing as “extraordinary” the court’s position
that:
[T]he remedy is under the control of the state; and,
so long as the legislation only alters or impairs it, to what the judiciary
deems a reasonable extent, then it is not within the constitutional
prohibition; but when it does so to an unreasonable extent, then it is. . .
.[T]his is . . .but a judicial discretion to revise legislation; and in my judgment,
there is no authority for it in the constitution.[19]
And in 1861, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded:
The terms and import of this provision show that it
relates altogether to the judicial department . . . which is to administer
justice “by due course of law,” and not
to the legislative department, by which such “due course of law” may be
prescribed.
Any other construction would make it inconsistent with
other clauses of the constitution, and, in fact, render it practically absurd.[20]
Not until after the Civil War was there any reported
opinion dealing with a remedies clause challenge to a statute limiting a tort
claim. In 1874, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld a law providing those who worked on or near a railroad
only the same right to sue the railroad as the railroad’s employees would have.[21] The Court concluded that no fundamental
right had been “cut off or struck down,”[22]
because the doctrine of respondeat superior “is only an offspring of law.”[23]
Since the servant could still be sued for negligence, the law was
constitutional. But the next year, the
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment striking down a statute that limited a
railway’s damages to $5000 for death and $3000 for personal injury, and the
Supreme Court affirmed.[24] While the court cited the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1874, it is not clear whether it relied solely on the remedies
clause or a provision providing for no limitation of damages.[25] Five years later the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania explained:
[W]e are not convinced that Railroad v. Cook should be
overruled. Its authority is in
conservation of the reserved right to every man, that for an injury done him in
his person, he shall have a remedy by due course of law. The people have withheld power from the
legislature to deprive them of that remedy, or to circumscribe it so that a
jury can give only a pitiful fraction of the damage sustained. Nothing less than the full amount of
pecuniary damage which a man suffers from an injury to him in his lands, goods
or person, fills the measure secured to him in the Declaration of Rights.[26]
Finally, in 1887, a federal district judge in Oregon
alluded to the remedies clause as a grounds for invalidating a tort statute.[27] The plaintiff sued a county for injuries
sustained while crossing a defective bridge in a horse-drawn buggy.[28] While the case was pending, the limited
suits against counties to contract actions.[29] The court stated that in its judgment, the statute was invalid because “the
legislature cannot, in the face of [the remedies clause], deny to anyone a
remedy by due course of law for an injury arising from the wrongful act or
omission of a county.”[30] However, the court concluded it was “content
to rest the decision of this case on the conclusion that the amendment . . .
does not and was not intended to affect the plaintiff’s right of action”
because it was passed after the action commenced, and, as a rule of
construction, had to be interpreted as applying to future actions.[31]
Not until 1901 did a court rely squarely on the right
to a remedy.[32] In Mattson v. Astoria, a municipal
ordinance completely eliminated all remedies for persons injured by a defective
public street.[33] The Oregon Supreme court held that “[t]he
constitutional provision guaranteeing to every person a remedy by due course of
law for injury done him in person or property . . . was intended to preserve
the common-law right of action for injury to person or property, and while the
legislature may change the remedy or form of procedure, attach conditions
precedent to its exercise, and perhaps abolish old and substitute new remedies,
it cannot deny a remedy entirely.”[34]
In the last
two decades of the nineteenth century, courts refused to resort to the remedies
guarantee to strike down legislation, except that which struck down “vested” rights of action, such as
those that spring “from contracts, or from principles of common law.”[35] State judicial realization of the full
import of the remedies clause did not come until the heydey of Lochnerism.[36] Just as an earlier generation of state
courts had used the remedies clause in combination with impairment of
contracts, state courts now used the remedies clause in tandem with substantive
due process to “enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”[37]
promote Herbert Spencer’s world view.
This aggressive use of the remedies clause, however,
was tempered when state courts faced challenges to emerging workers’
compensation systems. All states eventually adopted these plans, and they were
generally upheld by the courts, although in some instances constitutional
amendments were necessary to satisfy or overcome judicial objections.[38]
While inconsistent with some modern views of the right
to a remedy, these early cases were surprisingly consistent with Blackstone’s
view. In most early American cases,
the courts were bound to supply a remedy for every right, whether created by
common law or statute. But they
were not bound to preserve any particular remedy or procedure for vindicating
the right. As long as the new law
preserved the injured person’s ability to vindicate his or her rights in court
or provided an adequate substitute remedy, the right to a remedy was not
violated. The courts also allowed
legislatures to limit remedies derived from relative law, such as
respondeat superior, in part because the injured person retained the right to
obtain a judicial remedy against the individual who caused the injury, that is,
the individual violated the injured person’s absolute right to personal
security.
Most state courts also upheld legislative repeal of
the so-called heart balm actions in the mid-twentieth century, but their
reasons for doing so added still new variations to the doctrine.[39] For example, in Pennington v. Stewart,
the Indiana Supreme Court held that the affections of the plaintiff’s wife were
not property rights.[40] It further held that because marriage and
divorce were controlled by the legislature, and a cause of action for
alienation of affections was an incident marriage, it was also within the
purview of the legislature to alter or eliminate the cause of action.[41] Furthermore, in Haskins v. Bias, the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that these causes of actions were no longer
“properly considered recognizable at law” and had been severely criticized
because “of their peculiar susceptibility to abuse and the changing attitude
toward the status of women.”[42] Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution did not apply because the court had previously held it only
applied to “wrongs that are recognized by law.”[43]
One commentator, criticizing the
heart-balm decisions, observed: “The fact that the legislature’s decision was
not controversial does not make it constitutional if it denies fundamental
rights.”[44] And widely divergent outcomes resulted from
challenges to the various statutes of repose passed in the 1960s and 1970s to
help architects, engineers, builders and others in the construction field. Because these statutes cut off certain
claims before they even arose, they were in tension with the established
remedies doctrine in many states. Yet
most of these statutes have been upheld against remedies attacks,[45]
though a significant number have been struck down.[46]
Another wave of remedies challenges were brought
against laws passed in the 1970s and 1980s regulating medical malpractice
suits. Many portions of these statutes,
if not entire laws, were struck down on equal protection,[47]
jury trial,[48]
privileges and immunities,[49]
and due process,[50]
separation of powers grounds,[51]
as well as on the right to a remedy.[52] At the same time, state courts upheld a
number of statutes against all such attacks.[53]
Now remedies challenges are being leveled against many
recent “tort reform” laws. Taking
advantage of new state constitutional law treatises, law review articles, and
increased interstate dialogue between state appellate justices, many current
remedies opinions are often longer and more thoughtful, but as yet they are no
more consistent. Indeed, current
variations between and even within states are truly confounding. Justice Linde memorably observed that his
own Supreme Court of Oregon “has written many individually tenable but
inconsistent opinions” about the remedies guarantee.[54]
III.
Categories of Recent Decisions
Some scholars, wading through this morass, have
attempted to classify or systematize the various approaches.[55] Many of their approaches are instructive,
though I do not find any compelling. At
best, the disarray may be organized into certain rubrics which recur from state
to state.
A. Quid Pro
Quo
First, all states apparently recognize the doctrine of
a substitute remedy, or quid pro quo, as a justification for legislative
change. But some states hold that the
substitute need only benefit society as a whole,[56]
while others require that it benefit the individual plaintiff.[57]
And when they require an individual
benefit, courts differ on how closely the new remedy must replicate the one it
replaced.[58]
Even more disparity occurs when the statute does not
provide a quid pro quo. Some courts
hold that such laws must invariably be struck down.[59]
More opinions take something of a “due process” approach — that is, the courts
will uphold the legislative choice if it bears a rational or perhaps a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate
or permissible legislative goal.[60] But still other opinions, borrowing federal
equal protection terminology, require something akin to intermediate scrutiny
in deciding whether to permit the legislative restriction.[61] A few decisions have required “an
overpowering public necessity” to uphold a restriction without a substitute
remedy.[62]
Finally, some opinions use different standards of scrutiny based on the
nature of the remedy being infringed.[63]
In evaluating the restriction, some opinions look only
at the legislative purpose in changing the law, while others “balance” the
loss of the plaintiff’s loss of a remedy against the general benefit to society.[64] The standards articulated by courts for
conducting this balance typically provide little guidance to constrain the
judges’ personal preferences.[65]
B. Application
to Common Law Only
Second, regardless of the standard employed, most
decisions hold that the remedies clause only impedes legislatures from altering
or amending a common law remedy, not a statutorily-created one.[66] Some opinions hold that the common law
remedy must be “well-established.”[67]
That can merely mean that the remedy is older than the statute that allegedly
impairs it,[68] or
that the remedy was settled when the constitution was adopted.[69]
But all these distinctions assume that the bench and bar can tell whether
today’s cause of action is the same or different than one from a century or two
ago, a task that sometimes confounds even legal historians.[70]
Some judges reject all these distinctions as
artificial.[71] They
see the guarantee as encompassing both statutory and common law provisions with
importance rather age or pedigree being the principal inquiry. For example, one justice would apply the
remedies provision to protect a statute, a judicial holding or even a custom
which is “engrained into the fabric of the law so as to acquire fundamental and
basic status.”[72]
C. Delay
or Denial of Access
Third, some opinions limit only statutes that delay
or deny access to the courts, not those that deny or restrict substantive
relief.[73] Thus, in medical malpractice cases, Missouri
has struck down pre-suit screening panels but upheld caps on damages.[74]
Others protect only against retroactive changes in the law. Thus, the legislature can change or abolish
any cause of action, but the remedies clause protects the claims of those
individuals whose causes of action had accrued at the time of the change.[75]
And some decisions hold, that the remedy clause is not violated by the
complete abolition of a remedy if the legislature has left a plaintiff a
similar remedy against other defendants.[76]
D. No
Restriction on Legislation
Finally, a significant number of opinions hold that
the remedies guarantee does not constrain any substantive legislation. For
example, in North Carolina, “the remedy constitutionally guaranteed must be one
that is legally cognizable. The
legislature has the power to define the circumstances under which a remedy is
legally cognizable and those under which it is not.”[77] Other courts have reached the same result by
describing the guarantee as merely a general principle, not a constitutional
standard.[78]
IV. Should the
Guarantee be Narrowly Construed?
In surveying this morass, it is certainly tempting to
give the remedies guarantee a narrow or constricted scope. Among the reasons that suggest caution to me
are these:
First, the paucity of historical information
significantly impedes our ability to interpret and develop the clause with any
confidence.[79] Some
jurists and scholars have suggested that constitutional texts which have never
engendered broad interest or public debate do not deserve to be interpreted in
the same broad fashion as the “great ordinances of the Constitution.”[80]
Second, it is difficult to put parameters on the scope
of judicial review in a remedies challenge.
For example, if Congress is to make no law respecting the establishment
of religion, then a court can test a law against a judicially-fashioned
standard of what constitutes establishment.
But the essence of lawmaking is the fixing of rights and
responsibilities and the creation of remedies when they are breached. Logically, any change in any law that may be
enforced through a civil action could violate the a remedies
guarantee. But no one contends that the
law can or should be frozen, or that only the judicial branch should be
empowered as the agent of change. Thus,
the remedies clause is clearly in tension with the separation of powers
doctrine that is the genius of the American system. For example, forty-two states have
constitutional or statutory reception clauses, providing that the common
law shall control unless and until changed by statutory law.[81] The remedies guarantee must be
harmonized with the legislature’s undoubted right to make broad policy.[82] As one justice has queried: “How do
courts supply content to the provision without overstepping their traditional
role and legislating themselves?”[83]
Third, our view of the common law is quite different
from that of the founders two centuries ago.
Their guides were Coke and Blackstone, for whom the common law was
not simply a judicial creation. Rather it was a pre-existing body of truth,
in part or in whole divinely inspired,[84]
that was merely “discovered” by judges.
Thus, “[c]ases were mere evidence of the law as opposed to comprising
the law itself.”[85]
Today, we regard the common law as dynamic, not static. We see judicial opinions not as “mere
evidence of the law’s content,”[86]
but as the law itself. Is this
mutable, temporary, and very obviously human law as worthy of constitutional
protection as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky?”[87]
Fourth, the scope and function of the common law has
changed rather dramatically since most states adopted their remedies
provisions. In 1776, and well into the
nineteenth century, most law was judge-made, not statutory.[88]
Christopher Columbus Langdell, after all, felt able to teach the “science” of
law exclusively through the “case method.”[89]
But as codified law increased, more rights and remedies were legislatively, not
judicially, created.[90]
From wrongful death acts to private
antitrust actions to the Uniform Commercial Code to consumer protection statutes, legislatures, not courts, now
are the prime creators of new rights and remedies. Can state courts in good conscience say to their legislatures,
“well, sure, you’ve created all these causes of action for all these wrongs,
but you can’t touch this right because some judge recognized it in England a
few hundred years ago.” Isn’t that ignoring the beam in the judicial eye while
obsessing on the mote in the legislative one?
Moreover, if early nineteenth century state courts did not accord
constitutional protection to common law remedies when they were much more
pervasive than they are now, why should modern courts strain to protect such
remedies?
Fifth, and finally, the aggressive use of the remedies
guarantee creates the danger of a “see-saw” battle between judges and
legislators.[91] Already, legislatures in at least two states
have sent constitutional amendments to the voters to overrule remedy decisions
by the state supreme court.[92]
Moreover, the continued judicial rejection of popularly supported legislative
changes risks “federalizing” more law, as proponents of reform will turn to
Congress to provide national solutions to problems traditionally left to the
states. One example is the on-going
attempts to federalize the law of products liability.[93] I do not say that courts should disregard
the law for prudential concerns. But as
a Texan, I do offer for guidance Congressman David Crockett’s motto: “Be sure
you are right, then go ahead.”[94]
V. New
Approaches to Interpreting the Remedies Guarantee
Mindful of such considerations, many scholars have
devised new approaches to reign in the remedies clause. For instance, one professor would allow
the legislature to abolish a cause of action entirely, because that’s
substantive, but not to place limitations or restrictions on that could be
deemed procedural on the same cause of action.[95] That has the perverse effect of encouraging
the legislature to make wholesale changes in common law principles when a mere
tweak could satisfy the perceived need for change. Another commentator suggests that “[a]n open courts clause
analysis consistent with the origins of the provision should focus not on
whether the legislature has abolished a ‘remedy’ but on whether the challenged
action compromises the judiciary as an independent branch of government.”[96] This may be close to right, but it needs
more explication to be useful. Some of
my colleagues feel compromised when ever the legislature is sitting, while for
others only a reduction in judicial pay would meet that standard! Finally, one scholar’s proposal that a court
may authorize a remedy only when the legislature has created a right without a
remedy[97]
would be useful only if the lawmakers are singularly perverse or dim-witted.
Given all these problems, is the remedies guarantee
merely constitutional detritus, like a Rhode Islanders’ fundamental right to
gather seaweed on the beach?[98] Not at all.
Certainly, remedies jurisprudence has much to offer in enhancing access
to justice the best years of the clause may lie ahead. As one scholar has noted, “the state
declarations embody a much broader concept of access than does the first
amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.”[99] In an era when “there is too much law for
the rich and too little law for the poor,” in Derek Bok’s felicitous phrase[100]
the remedies clause may impose some level of responsibility on courts to see
that all citizens secure the promise of equal justice under law.[101] When one sees legislatures willing to create
new courts only if they will produce a positive revenue stream from fines and
fees, the guarantee may help preserve an independent and co-equal judiciary.[102]
And when our nation’s highest court refuses to let cameras broadcast its
proceedings, and allows near-contemporaneous audio broadcasts only if the
presidency is perceived to be at stake,[103]
the open courts guarantee might be read to ensure meaningful public access to
state court proceedings in an era of tiny courtrooms but global
interconnectivity.
As to whether and to what extend the right to a remedy
should preserve substantive rights from legislative encroachment, I must
confess continued irresolution. But let
me offer one hypothesis, or rather a provisional hypothetical, of how a close
reading of history might support a definite, but limited, role for the
guarantee in curbing legislative excess.
Consider again Blackstone’s hierarchy of rights, which was familiar to
the framers of our eighteenth and nineteenth century constitutions.[104] Blackstone considered the primary
absolute rights — personal security,
personal liberty, and property — to be protected by the subordinate absolute
rights, such as right to a remedy.[105] Many causes of action that legislatures have
typically sought to restrict, including loss of consortium, alienation of
affections or respondeat superior, would surely to Blackstone be mere relative
rights that could be altered or abolished.[106] Moreover, even absolute rights could be
protected through administrative schemes or alternate dispute resolution
mechanisms, so long as these procedures adequately protected the claimant.
Furthermore, many elements of damages that have raised legislative skepticism,
such as mental anguish or hedonic damages, would not be proscribed by
Blackstone because freedom from psychological torment was not regarded as an
absolute right. Punitive damages and other elements which do not redress an
injury would also be outside the scope of the Blackstonian remedy.
But if a legislature, perhaps buckling to inordinate
pressure from a well-organized and highly vocal special interest group, sought
to deny all recovery for a well-recognized action that did implicate absolute
rights, the remedy guarantee would come into play. Under this approach, medical lobbyists would be checked if they
convinced a state to abolish all medical malpractice claims, railroad interests
could not succeed in eliminating all crossing claims, and retail groups could
not end all slip and falls. As the
Supreme Court of Maine has concluded, the remedies guarantee forbids
legislative limitations “so unreasonable as to deny meaningful access to
judicial process.”[107] Thus, consistent with both the ancient
notions of Blackstone and the modern realities of legislative and judicial
roles, a right to a remedy along these lines could be a narrow but potent
protection for basic rights.
VI. Conclusion
Given the continuing importance of remedies law, I
submit that state courts have an urgent responsibility to develop a coherent, reasonable
doctrine for resolving these cases. Closer attention to the history and purpose
of the clause may help state courts meet this challenge. While tonight’s address does not purport to
provided final answers, it hopefully has provoked further productive thought.
[1]Gordon Wood, Foreward: State
Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 Rutgers L.J. 911, 920 (1993) (quoting The Crisis, No. XI, 81-87 (New York,
1775). The initial American Constitutional initiative was chaotic, not
systematic. Some states kept their
royal charters throughout the Revolution or beyond, while others were unsure
about whether or to what extent their constitutions actually constrained
legislative behavior. Some states tried to ensure the primacy of the new
documents by declaring some or all parts of the new constitutions to be
unchangeable (as in Virginia and Delaware) or by requiring extraordinary
legislative majorities to change (as in Delaware, Maryland and New
Jersey). Vermont, unsure whether a
constitutional convention was legal, went so far as to have its legislature
re-enact its 1777 constitution. Id.
at 920-24.
[2]Section 12 of the Declaration of
Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State, passed September 11, 1776,
borrowed language from Lord Coke to provide:
That every freeman for every injury
done him in his goods, lands or person, by any other person, ought to have
remedy by the due course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and
right for the injury done to him freely without sale, fully without denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.
Section 26 of the Plan or Frame of Government for the
Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania provided: “All courts shall be open, and
justice shall be impartially administered without corruption or were simply
unnecessary delay.” Pa. Const. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government for the Commonwealth or
State of Pennsylvania, § 26, available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm
(The Avalon Project at Yale Law School) (last visited 7/01/02) (citing The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now
or Heretofore Forming the United States of America (compiled and edited
under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909)).
The distinctions between these two provisions form the
basic division between remedies clauses today.
See supra notes 8-9.
[3]Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North
Carolina all followed the Delaware model, although North Carolina’s
constitutional provision applied only to persons restrained of their
liberty. Md. Const. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights,
and the Constitution and Form of Government agreed to by the Delegates of
Maryland, in Free and Full Convention Assembled, art. 17, available at http://elsinore.cis.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm
(The Avalon Project at Yale Law School) (last visited 7/03/02); Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1: A Declaration
of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, art. 11, available
at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm
(National Humanities Institute 1999) (last visited 7/05/02); New Hampshire Const. of 1784, Part 1: Bill of Rights, art. 14, in 4 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now
or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 2455 (compiled and
edited under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909); N.C. Const. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. 13, available
at http://elsinore.cis.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nc07.htm
(The Avalon Project at Yale Law School) (last visited 7/03/02) (citing The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now
or Heretofore Forming the United States of America (compiled and edited
under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909)).
[4]Kentucky, Tennessee, and Vermont, all of which
followed the Pennsylvania model. Ky. Const.
of 1792, art. 12, §
13, in 3 The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States,
Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of
America 1275 (compiled and edited under the Act of Congress of June 30,
1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1909); Tenn. Const. of 1796, art.
11, § 17, available at http://vi.uh.edu/pages/alhmat/tenncon.html
(University of Houston History Department) (last visited 7/03/02); Vt. Const. of 1777, Ch. 2: Plan or
Frame of Government, § 23, available at http://elsinore.cis.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/vt01.htm
(The Avalon Project at Yale Law School) (last visited 7/03/02) (citing The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now
or Heretofore Forming the United States of America (compiled and edited
under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909)).
Delaware itself switched to the Pennsylvania model in
1792, with Art. I, Section 9 of its new constitution providing:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his
reputation, person, moveable or immoveable
possessions, shall have
remedy by the due course of law, and justice
administered according to
the very right of the cause, and the law of the land,
without sale, denial,
or unreasonable delay or expense;¼
1 The Federal
and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the
States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States
of America 569 (compiled and edited under the Act of Congress of June
30, 1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1909). Today, twenty-eight
states use something resembling the original Pennsylvania formulation; only ten
states still adhere to Coke’s language.
See John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions
and the Proper Role of the State Courts,
26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 237, 244, 284-88 (1991) (providing a complete
list of state-constitution remedies provisions).
[5]Of the eight states which accompanied their
ratification of the federal Constitution with suggestions for additional
amendments, three included a remedies provision. The Virginia Ratification Convention proposed:
That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by
recourse to the laws
for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his
person, property or
character. He
ought to obtain right and justice freely and without sale,
completely and without denial, promptly and without
delay, and that all
establishments or regulations, contravening these
rights, are oppressive and
unjust.
10 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of
the Constitution: Virginia 1552 (Kaminski and Saladino eds., Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1993); 18 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
Commentaries on the Constitution 202, 315 (Kaminski and Saladino eds.,
Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1995). North Carolina submitted a proposed
amendment identical to Virginia’s. Compare
Ratification of the Constitution by the State of North Carolina; November 21,
1789, available at
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratnc.htm> (The Avalon Project at Yale Law
School) (last visited 11/13/02), with Ratification
of the Constitution by the State of Virginia; June 26, 1788, available at
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratva.htm. Rhode Island’s statement of ratification
included this proposal:
That every freeman ought to obtain right and justice
freely and without sale; completely, and without denial; promptly, and without
delay; and that all establishments and regulations contravening these rights
are oppressive and unjust.
William R. Staples, Rhode
Island in the Continental Congress, with the Journal of the Convention that
Adopted the Constitution, 1765-1790, 652, 676 (Reuben Aldridge Guild
ed., Providence, Providence Press Co., Printers to the State, 1870), available
at http://name.umdl.umich.edu/AQJ4219.
The Virginia proposals were submitted to ratifiers in
New York, Letter, George Mason to John Lamb, June 9, 1788, 9 The Documentary History of the Ratification of
the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Virginia
818 (Kaminski and Saladino eds., Madison: State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1990), but the New Yorkers did not include a remedies guarantee in
their own proposals. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York;
July 26, 1788, available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratny.htm>
(The Avalon Project at
Yale Law School) (last visited 11/13/02). Of the six states with a remedies provision
in their own constitution, only North Carolina recommended that the federal
constitution follow suit.
Despite the Virginia recommendation, Congressman James
Madison from that state, who led the effort to adopt a federal bill of rights,
did not propose a remedies clause for the Bill of Rights. Moreover, there is no record that any member
of the House of Representatives urged its inclusion. But in the Senate, an amendment to guarantee a remedy for all
injuries or wrongs was offered and rejected on September 8. Koch, Jr., supra note 31, at 374-75.
Because of the limited role of federal courts under
the new government, the members of the First Congress were wise to exclude the
right to a remedy from the new Constitution.
See Hans Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in
Oregon, 49 Or. L. Rev. 125, 138 n.38 (1970) (the limited role of the
federal government in matters of common law justified the exclusion of a right
to a remedy, but the inclusion of the federal due process clause in the Bill of
Rights “made sense” as a way to “secure that the new government would exercise
its untried powers over life, liberty, and property by due process of
law.”). After all, the Constitution
requires only one federal court, the Supreme Court, with Congress empowered but
not required to create inferior courts.
And the Constitution did not intend for federal judges to take the lead
in creating or modifying common law causes of action. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
(“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State whether they be local in their nature or “general,” be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power on the
federal courts.”).
For many years, it appeared that the federal
constitution might still protect the right to a remedy under the due process
clause. For a discussion of that
development, see supra note 41 above.
[6]Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364,
1814 WL 1038, at *2 (1814).
[7]See, e.g., Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559,
1859 WL 2864, at *10 (1859) (“All the authorities agree that it is within the
power of the legislature to repeal, amend, change, or modify the laws governing
proceedings in courts¼so
that they leave the parties a substantial remedy.”).
[8]Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311,
316, 1 How. 311 (1843) (observing that a state may alter a remedy so long as
“the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract”).
[9]Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. 1,
1821 WL 393, at *10 (Tenn.Err. & App. 1821).
[10]Id. at *11.
[11]Id.
[12]Id.
[13]E.g., Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Chambers,
16 Miss. 9, 1847 WL 1741 (Miss.Err. & App. 1847); Riggs, Peabody, & Co.
v. Martin, 5 Ark. 506, 1844 WL 432 (1844); Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. 1
(Tenn.Err. & App. 1821); Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 1859 WL 2864
(1859).
[14]When reading early cases with a modern eye, it is
often difficult to find precisely on what authority a court purports to
act. Unlike today’s courts, which
generally resolve cases on a single ground and which dismiss as dicta any statement
not directly necessary to that holding, courts in the 1800s routinely struck
down laws on every applicable ground and without any indication that only one
of the alternative holdings was law. E.g.,
Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13 (1862) (striking down stay law under five
constitutional provisions, including the remedies clause, contracts clause,
prohibition on ex post facto laws, privileges and immunities clause and the
guarantee of a grand jury in criminal matters); see also Commercial Bank
of Natchez v. Chambers, 16 Miss. 9, 1847 WL 1741 (Miss.Err. & App. 1847);
Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 1859 WL 2864 (1859).
In other cases of that period, the court would fail to
identify any particular authority for a judicial outcome. As late as 1871, the Chief Justice of
Wisconsin said in what may have been a remedies case:
I care very little whether it is placed on those
fundamental principles of law and justice which, in our form of government is
has been held that no legislative body can override, even though not prohibited
by the written constitution, or upon the provisions of the constitution itself,
some of which clearly forbid the enactment of such laws.
Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 1871 WL
2939 *2; see Judith S. Kaye,
Forward: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the
Protection of Individual Rights, 23 Rutgers
L.J. 727, 730-32 (1992) (observing that the common law and
constitutional law often embody the same principles, and commenting that “the
mere fact that a common law right received constitutional recognition did not
signify that it was thereby extinguished as a common law right”).
[15]Pawley v. McGimpsey, 15 Tenn. 502,
1835 WL 883 (Tenn.Err. & App. 1835).
[16]Id. at *2.
[17]Thus, early decisions upheld a five dollar tax on
losing litigants, Harrison, Pepper & Co. v. Willis, 54 Tenn. 35, 1871 WL
3911, at *6 (1871) (tax does not violate the “letter or spirit” of the open
courts clause), and a three dollar fee to obtain a jury trial. Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456, 1862 WL
1291, at *5 (1862) (“[t]he constitution does not guarantee to the citizen the
right to litigate without expense, but simply protects him from the imposition
of such terms as unreasonably and injuriously interfere with his right to a
remedy”). See also State ex. rel
Davidson v. Gorman, 41 N.W. 948, 950 (Minn. 1889); Flood v. State, 117 So. 385,
387 (Fla. 1928). But at least one court
struck down a law requiring a tax or assessment to be paid before it could be
challenged in court. Weller v. City of
St. Paul, 5 Minn. 95, 1860 WL 2892, at *6 (1860) (construing the
“unconscionable and unjust” tax requirement as potentially “amount[ing] to an
entire denial of justice”); see also Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill. 43, 1869
WL 5382 (Ill. 1869) (striking down revenue law requiring a party to show he has
paid all the taxes due on land before challenging a tax title set up against
him); Bennet v. Davis, 37 A. 864 (Me. 1897) (striking down statute requiring
party to pay the amount claimed against him, including costs and interest,
before beginning his defense).
[18]Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 1862
WL 1242, *6-7 (1862) (declaring that “the legislature cannot, directly or
indirectly¼deprive [a citizen] of his
constitutional right to commence, maintain, or defend any action or other
judicial proceeding”).
[19]Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559,
1859 WL 2864, at *16 (Paine, J., dissenting).
[20]Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. 566,
1862 WL 4825, at *5 (1862).
[21]Kirby v. Pa. R.R. Co., 76 Pa. 506,
1874 WL 13229 (1874).
[22]Id. at *3.
[23]Id.
[24]Central R.R. of N.J. v. Cook, 1
W.N.C. 319 (Pa. 1875).
[25]Id.
[26] Thirteenth and Fifteenth St.
Passenger Rail Co. v. Boudrou, 8 W.N.C. 241, 92 Pa. 475, 1880 WL 13607, at *6
(1880).
[27]Eastman v. County of Clackamas, 32 F. 24 (D.Or. 1887).
[28]Id. at 25.
[29]Id.
[30]Id. at 32.
[31]Id. But see Templeton v. Linn County, 29
P. 795 (Or. 1892) (refusing to strike down statute based on the remedies
guarantee).
[32]Mattson v. Astoria, 65 P. 1066 (Or. 1901).
[33]Id. at 1066.
[34]Id. at 1067.
[35]See Mayor and Council of Wilmington,
v. Ewing, 43 A. 305 (Del. 1899); Edwards v. Johnson, 5 N.E. 716 (Ind. 1886); Templeton v. Linn County, 29 P. 795, 797, 22 Or. 313,
318 (1892); Schuman, supra note 42, at 46.
[36] Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
[37]Id. at 74
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Herbert
Spencer, The Man Versus the State 19 (John Offer
ed., Cambridge University Press 1994) (man’s liberty “is to be measured, not by
the government machinery he lives under, but by the relative paucity of the
restraints it imposes on him”).
[38] 99 C.J.S.
Workman’s Compensation §§17-19 (1958).
Decisions to uphold the statute were decided frequently on the basis
that the employee or employer, or both, had the ability to opt out of the
scheme. See, e.g., Shade
v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 144 P. 248, 250 (Kan. 1914)
(because the compensation system rests on the consent of the employer and
employee, all remedies under common and statutory law remain intact); Matheson
v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 148 N.W. 71, 75 (Minn. 1914) (same); Shea v.
North-Butte Mining Co., 179 P. 499 (Mont. 1919); Evanhoff v. State
Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 154 P. 106, 111 (Or. 1915) (same); Scott v. Nashville
Bridge Co., 223 S.W. 844, 852 (Tenn. 1920) (no deprivation because the
act is optional and not compulsory).
[39]See Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419
(Fla. 1948) (in the public interest to abolish alienation of affections). But see Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464
(Ill. 1946) (striking down repeal).
[40]10 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. 1937).
[41]Id.
[42]441 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
[43]Id.
[44]John H. Bauman, Remedies
Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of State Courts, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 237, 278 (1991)
[45]See, e.g.,
Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Ark. 1970); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 827 (Colo. 1983); Zapata v. Burns, 542 A.2d 700, 709-11
(Conn. 1988); Cheswold Vol. Fire Co. v. Lambertson Const., 489 A.2d 413, 417
(Del. 1984); Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. v. Hamill, 644 P.2d 341,
346 (Idaho 1982); Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622, 628 (Ind. App. 1983);
Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381, 1387-88 (La. 1978);
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178, 188-89 (Md. 1985);
Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 522 (Mass. 1982); Anderson v. Fred Wagner
and Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So.2d 320, 324 (Miss. 1981); Blaske v. Smith
& Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 832-33 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); Reeves v.
Ille Electric Co., 551 P.2d 647, 650-51 (Mont. 1976); Williams v. Kingery
Const. Co., 404 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Neb. 1987); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302
S.E.2d 868, 880-82 (N.C. 1983); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness,
563 P.2d 143, 146 (Okl. 1977) (holding that the statute is nevertheless an
unconstitutional violation of the federal equal protection provision); Josephs
v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 207 (Or. 1971), abrogated by Smothers v. Gresham
Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 720-21 (Pa. 1978); Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543,
547-48 (R.I. 1985); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Associates, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522,
524 (Tenn. 1981); Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, 889 S.W.2d 259,
261-63 (Tex. 1994).
[46]See Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp.,
435 So.2d 725, 727-28 (Ala. 1983); Overland Const. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369
So.2d 572, 575 (Fla. 1979); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222-25 (Ky. 1973);
Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991); Brennaman v.
R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio 1994), overruling Sedar v.
Knowlton Const. Co., 551 N.E.2d 938, 947 (Ohio 1990); Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op.
Bldg. Supply Ass’n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 424-427 (S.D. 1984); Horton v. Goldminer’s
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1096 (Utah 1989); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D
Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Wis. 1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d
821, 831 (Wyo. 1980).
[47]Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984) (three-year
statute of repose for medical malpractice actions violated state equal
protection guarantee as to one class of claims, and not others); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d
155 (1984) (medical malpractice statute of limitations violated equal
protection); Farley v.
Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 740 P.2d 1058 (1987) (abrogation of collateral source
rule violates federal and state equal protection clauses); Wentling v. Medical
Anesthesia Servs., 237 Kan. 503, 701 P.2d 939 (1985) (abrogation of collateral
source rule violates equal protection); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6
Ohio St. 3d, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983) (one year statute of limitations as applied
to minors over ten years of age violates equal protection--no rational
basis); White v. State, 283 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983) ( $300,000 damage
cap on non-economic damages violates equal protection); Coffey v. Bresnahan, 127 N.H. 687, 506 A.2d
310 (1986) (statute of limitations violates equal protection by barring suits
of tort plaintiffs in survival actions after two years, when other tort
plaintiffs could recover for six years); Carson v. Maurer, 126 N.H. 925, 424
A.2d 825 (1980) (virtually all features of malpractice act held
unconstitutional remaining provisions non-severable, and therefore,
invalid); Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425,
659 P.2d 311 (1983) (review panel violates right of access to courts); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978)
(modification of collateral source rule and cap on damages violates equal
protection); Duren v. Suburban
Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 482 N.E.2d 1358 (1985) ($200,000 damage
cap violates equal protection); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343
N.E.2d 832 (1976) (modification of collateral source rule violates equal
protection); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (pre- trial screening
panel violates equal protection); Baptist Hosp. of S.E. Tex., Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.3d 296
(Tex. App. 1984) aff'd, 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986) ($500,000 damage cap
violates equal protection).
[48]Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976) (admission of review panel
finding at trial violates right to jury trial and equal protection); Heller v. Frankston, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d
1291 (1984) (limitation on attorneys' fees held unconstitutional violation of
right to jury trial); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980)
(delay in pre-screening panel requirement violates right to trial by jury); Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va.
1986) (damage cap violates Virginia's right to jury trial).
[49]Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz.
576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (requirement that party not prevailing before panel
post $2000 bond before proceeding to trial violated state privileges and
immunities clause).
[50]Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978)
(invalidating statute limiting total damages recoverable in a medical
malpractice action on substantive due process grounds); Gaines v.
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987) (statute of repose
unconstitutionally applied to medical malpractice victim who discovered injury
during period of repose but had an unreasonably short amount of time to file
suit); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 N.E. 51, 56 (Ohio 1985)
(invalidating $200,000 limitation on general damages recoverable in medical
malpractice action); Flippin v. Jarrell, 270 S.E.2d 482 (N.C. 1980) (statute of
limitations in medical malpractice action violated due process rights by providing
unreasonable time to file claim after discovery).
[51]Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219,
497 N.E.2d 763 (1986) (pre-trial screening panels violate separation of powers
under state constitution); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d
313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (pre-trial screening panels violate separation of
powers, and damage cap provision violates prohibition against special
legislation); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) ( ipsa loquitur
provisions violate exclusive authority of state supreme court to establish
rules of evidence).
[52]Smith v. Dept. of Ins., 507 So. 2d
1080 (Fla. 1987) ($450,000 damage cap violated right of access to courts);
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (review panel process violates
state due process right of access to courts); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (statute of limitation applicable to minors violates right
of access to courts); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for
Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (statutorily required pre-trial
panel review violates right of access to courts by imposing delay before
jurisdiction is obtained); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d
626 (1987) (restrictions on statute of limitations by abolishing discovery rule
violates constitutional provision granting right to remedy); Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (statute
of limitations violates right of access to courts); Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (statute of limitation cutting off cause of action
before discovery held unconstitutional); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.
1983) (two-year statute of limitations violates open courts).
[53]Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Lacy v. Green,
428 A.2d 1171 (Del. Super. 1981); Attorney General v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57 (Md.
1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d
122 (1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977); see, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Constitutional
Limitations on Tort Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable
Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the Perceived Liability
Insurance Crisis? 32 Vill. L. Rev. 1265,
1317-19 n.52 (1987).
[54]Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d
506, 518 (Or. 1989) (Linde, J., concurring).
See also Martin B. Marguiles, Connecticut’s Misunderstood
Remedy Clause, 14 QLR 217 (1994); Thomas P. Lewis, Jural Rights Under
Kentucky’s Constitution: Realities Grounded in Myth, 80 Ky. L.J. 953 (1992).
[55]See, e.g., Jennifer
Friesen, 1 State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and
Defenses _6-2(c)
(3rd ed.2000); Francis McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality
of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579, 616 (1981); David Schuman, The Right
to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197,
1205-17 (1992); Patrick E. Sullivan, Note, Medical Malpractice
Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the Courts, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 150, 170-77 (1983); Janice
Sue Wang, Note, State Constitutional Remedy Provisions and Article 1,
Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution: The Possibility of Greater
Judicial Protection of Established Tort Causes of Action and Remedies, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 203, 208-11 (1989).
[56]See Lemuz v. Feiser, 933 P.2d 134, 150
(Kan 1997) (finding that risk management requirements that benefit the public
are adequate quid pro quo for cause of action against a hospital for corporate
negligence).
[57]See Estabrook v. American Hoist &
Derrick, Inc., 498 A.2d 741, 746-8 (N.H. 1985), overruled by Young v.
Prevue Products, Inc., 534 A.2d 714, 717 (N.H. 1987).
[58]See Schuman, supra note 94, at
1210-11. Compare Texas Workers’
Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 521 (Tex. 1995) (comparing the quid pro
quo to the common law remedy), with Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1191
(Kan. 1991) (stating that the proper test is “whether the substitute remedy
would have been sufficient if the modification had been part of the original
act”).
[59]Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.,
23 P.3d 33, 356 (Or. 1999) (legislature must provide a substitute remedial
process when it abolishes any pre-1857 common law right).
[60]Thus, West Virginia courts will
uphold a law whose purpose is “to eliminate or curtail a clear social or
economic problem, and the alteration or repeal of the existing cause of action
or remedy is a reasonable method of achieving such purpose.” Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408
S.E.2d 634, 645 (W. Va. 1991). See also Haney v. Int’l Harvester Co.,
201 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn. 1972) (no
substitute needed “if abolition is in pursuit of a permissible legislative
objective”); Green v. Seigel, Barnett & Schutz, 557 N.W.2d 396, 401-04
(S.D. 1996); Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 67, 680 (Utah 1985) (must be a substantially equal alternative
benefit unless “clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means for achieving the objective”).
[61]See Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961,
979 (Ariz. 1984) (applying strict scrutiny equal protection analysis because
the state constitutional guarantee of open courts makes the right to a remedy
fundamental); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Mont. 1983) (using a similar
analysis), overruled by Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488
(Mont. 1989).
[62]Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel,
610 So.2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992). But
see Agency for Health Care Admin. v.. Assoc. Indus., 678 So.2d 1239, 1253
(Fla. 1996) (clarifying that a lesser standard applies when the legislature
abolishes affirmative defenses.
[63]See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102,
113-14 (Md. 1992) (quid pro quo required when statute abrogates recovery for
violation of fundamental rights, but maybe not when other common law rights are
abrogated).
[64]See Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 706
S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (medical malpractice statute of repose
struck down because cost to injured persons outweighs societal good).
[65]As I said in my dissent in Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 717 (Tex. 1988):
With all
due respect, these approaches [in the court’s other three opinions] all suffer
from a common vice: they require this court to strike a delicate balance
between important competing interests without any standards for evaluating the
relative importance of those interests.
This unfettered discretion leaves us with little more than our personal
predilections on which to rely in reaching our decision. One justice therefore
finds the cap to be “reasonable,” the other justices condemn the cap as “unfair
and unreasonable” or “unreasonable and arbitrary.”
(citations
omitted).
[66]See, e.g., Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d
491, 497 (Minn. 1997); Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Tex.
1990). But see Kluger v. White,
281 So.2d 1, 4 (remedy is protected if provided by a statute passed prior to
effective date of constitution or if created by common law at any time).
[67]Trinity River Auth. v. URS
Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. 1994).
[68] See, e.g., Olson v. Ford
Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 497 (Minn. 1997) (seat belt gag rule not a violation
where it is older than crashworthiness doctrine it supposedly impaired);
Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. 1994)
(statute of repose not unconstitutional because common law had not recognized
discovery rule at time statute had passed).
[69]Stein v. Katz, 567 A.2d 1183, 1186
(Conn. 1989) (attempt to strike down dental repose statute failed because the plaintiff died before trial and negligence claims
abated at death under the common law when the constitution was adopted in
1818).
[70]Schuman, supra note 94, at 1209 (comparing Saylor
v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) (cause of action developed over time),
with Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1983), overruled by Perkins
v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991) (cause of action when
Kentucky constitution adopted)).
[71]See David Schuman, The Right to a
Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197,
1217 (1992); Neher v. Chartier, 879 P.2d 156, 161 (Or. 1994) (recognizing an
abandonment of the distinction between a statutory and common law claim).
[72]Lankford v. Sullivan, Long &
Hagerty, 416 So.2d 996, 1007 (Ala. 1982) (Jones, J., concurring).
[73]
See also Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971) (remedies
clause preserves procedural rights); Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566
(1861) (remedies clause relates only to the judiciary, not the legislature);
Commonwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1955) (applying the remedies clause
to the legislature as well as the judiciary).
Professor Schuman concludes that “history more logically supports a
‘substantive/procedural’ distinction than a ‘legislative/judicial’ one.” 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197, 1203.
[74]Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc.,
781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp.
for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); Adams v. Children’s Mercy
Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Mo. 1992).
[75]See Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261,
264 (Ala. 1939) (“Undoubtedly the right ot the remedy must remain and cannot be
curtailed after the injury has occurred and right of action vested, regardless
of the source of the duty which was breached, provided it remained in existence
when the breach occurred.”); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn.
1978) (guarantee only applies to “such injuries as constitute violations of
established law of which the courts can properly take cognizance.”). Justice Shores criticizes this approach as
providing no additional protection than that already provided by the ex post
facto prohibition. Fireman’s Fund
Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So.2d 334, 351 (Ala. 1981) (Shores, J.,
concurring).
[76]See Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432
N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. 1988) (statute of repose for manufacturer of improvement
to real property upheld because suit still available against owner and worker’s
compensation benefits available); Noonan v. City of Portland, 88 P.2d 808, 821
(Or. 1938) (remedy clause not violated because, though city is immune, suit
still available against negligent officials and abutting property owner), overruled
by Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 353 (Or. 2001).
[77]Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302
S.E.2d 868, 882 (N.C. 1983).
[78]Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305, 309-310 (La.
1986). In Idaho the remedies clause
“merely admonishes the Idaho courts to dispense justice and to secure citizens
the rights and remedies afforded by the legislature or by the common law.”
Hawley v. Green, 788 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Idaho 1990). See also O’Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 493 P.2d 344,
346 (Colo. 1972) (The remedies clause “simply provides that if a right does
accrue under the law, the courts will be available to effectuate that right.”);
Langevin v. City of Biddeford, 481 A.2d 495, 497 n.2 (Me. 1984) (stating that
the remedies clause does not create a fundamental right, but rather states a
general principle); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 645, 635 (Me. 1979) (citing the
remedies clause as a general principle); Ruth A. Mickelsen, The Use and
Interpretation of Article I, Section Eight of the Minnesota Constitution
1861-1984, 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 667,
675-80 (1984) (discussing nineteenth and early twentieth-century Minnesota
cases). Thus in Garing v. Fraser, 76
Me. 37 (Me. 1884), the Court explained: “To be sure, it is a general rule of
the common law and it has been substantially engrafted into . . . our constitution. . . . But the law has more than one idea. And this principle however sound must be
understood with such qualifications and limitations as other principles of law
equally sound and important impose upon it.”
[79]See generally Harold Levinson, Interpreting
State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 567 (1978).
[80]Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 831-32 (N.J. 1977); James Gray Pope, An
Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 Rutgers L.J. 985 (1993).
In
fairness, the right to a remedy was simply not one of the core freedoms for
which the revolution was fought. The
eighteen volumes thus far published of the comprehensive The Documentary History of the Ratification of
the Constitution include only
two letters from one anonymous pamphletter that discuss the issue at all. An Additional Number of Letters
from the Federal Farmer to the Republican; Leading to a Fair Examination of the
System of Government, Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential
and Necessary Alterations in It; and Calculated to Illustrate and support the
Principles and Positions Laid Down in the Preceding Letters, 17 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
Commentaries on the Constitution: Public and Private 265 (John P. Kaminski and Gaspare
J.Saladino, eds.(1995).The pamphlet appeared sometime before May 2, 1788, when
its publication was announced in New York Journal and New York Packet.
Id.
One letter mentioned that “having
free recourse to the laws” was a “natural and unalienable” right “of which even
the people cannot deprive individuals.”
Id. at 273-74. A second
letter argued for the explicit protection of the right to a remedy in the
federal constitution. While by “long
custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c.,” the people had become
“entitled to obtain right and justice freely and without delay” in the state
courts, the federal courts were new and had no such tradition. Id. at 347 (Letter XVI, January 20,
1788).
[81]Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens, Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present and Future: Solving Old
Problems and Dealing with the “New Style” Litigation, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 237, 252 (2000).
[82]See Note, Constitutional Guarantees of a Certain Remedy,
49 Iowa L. Rev. 1202, 1205 (1964)
and cases at n.18; Lucas v. Bishop, 273 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Ark. 1954) (remedies
clause does not allow the court to transgress the division of powers to create
a means of redress for an injury); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So.2d 243, 250 (Fla.
1945) (en banc) (“The words ‘for any injury *** [he] shall have remedy, by due
course of law’ do not mean that strictly legislative power is delegated to the
courts.”); Simons v. Kidd, 38 N.W.2d 883, 886 (S.D. 1949) (remedies clause does
not allow the judicial usurpation of legislative powers). But see State ex rel. Watkins
v. Fernandez, 143 So. 638, 641 (1932) (“In a changing world marked by the ebb
and flow of social and economic shifts, new conditions constantly arise which
make it necessary, that no right be without a remedy, to the extend the old and
tried remedies. It is the function of
the courts to do this.” (emphasis added)). In 1989, the Montana Supreme Court overruled three decisions
less than ten years old to hold:
Montana’s remedy clause seeks to
guarantee equal access to courts to obtain remedies for injuries as provided by
governing law. It does not, however,
impart a definition of what the law considers a remedy or full legal redress. Nor does it empower this court to exclude
the legislature from defining what are legal injuries.
Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 507 (Mont. 1989),
overruling Corrigan v. Janney, 626 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1981); White v. State, 661
P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); and Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont.1985).
[83]Fireman’s Fund American Ins. Co. v.
Coleman, 394 So.2d 334, 351 (Ala. 1980) (Shores, J., concurring).
[84]1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *39, *41.
[85]Blackstone wrote in reaction to
legal changes wrought by the incipient Industrial Revolution. As one commentator as concluded:
Blackstone saw the inadequacies of
the common law as arising from alterations to its original form. For him, the study of history might make it
possible to bring such deviations back into congruence with the common law’s
initial perfect state.
Christian F. Southwick, Note, Unprecedented: The Eighth Circuit
Repaves Antiquas Vias with a New Constitutional Doctrine, 21 Rev. Litig. 191, 246 (2002) (citing Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of
Law 27, 68 (1941)).
[86]Christian F. Southwick, Note, Unprecedented: The
Eighth Circuit Repaves Antiquas Vias with a New Constitutional Doctrine, 21
Rev. Litig. 191, 253 (2002).
[87]S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
[88]See John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial
Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on the Role of the Judge,
58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 203,
207-09 (2001); Kaye, supra note 67, at 728, 730-32.
[89]See, e.g., Arthur E.
Sutherland, The Law at Harvard 162-205 (Cambridge: Belknap Press 1967). Cf. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law 42 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1977) (“Langdell seems to
have been an essentially stupid man who, early in his life hit on one great
idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of a genius.”).
[90]See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, State
Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1, 8-9 (1995).
[91]Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens, Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present, and Future: Solving old
Problems and dealing with the “New Style” Litigation, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 237, 240 (2000).
[92]Fireman’s Fund American Ins. Co. v.
Coleman, 394 So.2d 334, 352 (Ala. 1980) (Shores, J., concurring) (noting that
legislature amended Art. IV, s 82 of the Alabama Constitution to authorize
adoption of arbitration statutes in Alabama).
Constitutional Initiative No. 30, approved by the electorate Nov. 4,
1986, amended the Montana Constitution Article II section 16 to read as
follows:
(1) Courts
of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for injury
of person, property, or character. Right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay.
(2) No
person shall be deprived of legal redress for injury incurred in employment for
which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his
immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage
under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this state.
(3) This
section shall not be construed as a limitation upon the authority of the legislature to enact statutes establishing, limiting,
modifying, or abolishing remedies, claims for relief, damages, or allocations
of responsibility for damages in any civil proceeding; except that any express
dollar limits on compensatory damages for actual economic loss for bodily
injury must be approved by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.
State
ex rel. Montana Citizens for the Preservation of Citizens’ Rights v.
Waltermire, 738 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Mont. 1987). However, the amendment failed
because of defects in presentation to the electors. Id. at 1264.
[93]E.g., Small
Business Liability Reform Act of 2001, S. 865, 107th Cong. § 2.04
(2001); see also Marcia Coyle, In
Washington, Old Fights are New Again: Onlookers Recall 90's Tort Reform Effort,
The National Law Journal (Nov. 18, 2002), available at <http://www.nlj.com/special/111802tort.shtml> (last
visited Nov. 26, 2002).
[94]David Crockett, Narrative of
the Life of David Crockett (1), 13
(Philadelphia: Carcy and Hart 1834).
[95]John H. Bauman, Remedies
Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts,
26 Wake For. L. Rev. 237, 240
(1991).
[96]Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the
Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of the State
Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279,
1316 (1995). Schuman agreed with this
approach in his early work, but rejected it later. Compare Schuman, supra note 42, at 67-68, with
The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L.
Rev. 1197, 1203, 1222 (1992).
[97]John H. Bauman, Comment, Implied
Causes of Action in State Courts, 30 Stan.
L. Rev. 1243, 1254-56 (1978).
[98]See R.I.
Const. art. I, _ 17.
[99]Jennifer
Friesen, 1 State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and
Defenses _ 6-7(b) (3rd ed. 2000). See Federated Publications, Inc. v.
Kurtz, 615 P.2d 440, 445-47 (Wash. 1980) (applying open courts provision to
pretrial proceedings, with some qualifications).
[101]See Jennifer
Friesen, 1 State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and
Defenses _
6-7(a) (3rd ed. 2000). ); see Griffin
Industries, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 934 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex.
1996) (“If a lawyer is unable or unwilling to pay out-of-pocket costs, an
indigent’s right to access to the courts would be at an end.”). But see Doe v. State, 579 A.2d 37, 46-47
(Conn. 1990) (open courts provision does not require the state to pay
indigents’ attorney’s fees in civil cases); Smith v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 573 So.2d 320, 322-24 (Fla. 1991) (finding a statutory,
but not constitutional right to free transcripts for indigents). For an extreme view, see Judith Anne Bass, Article
I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 871 (1977).
[102]John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions
in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 Wake For. L. Rev. 237, 246-47 (1991).
[103]Associated Press, Topeka Capital Journal, High Court
Oks Audio of Arguments (Dec. 10, 2000), at <http://quest.cjonline.com/stories/121000/sup_audio.shtml>
(last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
[104]Susan Abrams, Problems of Contemporaneous
Construction in State Constitutional Interpretation, 38 Brandeis L.J. 613,
613 (2000).
[105]1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *129-141.
[106]Friesen says it’s arguable that wrongful
death and other such causes of action are not person, property, or
reputation. Jennifer Friesen, 1 State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual
Rights, Claims, and Defenses _ 6-2(c), n.30 (3rd ed. 2000). She cites Kilminster v. Day Management Corp.,
919 P.2d 474, 479 (Or. 1996) (holding that remedies clause is not violated, as
claimants had no cause of action under common law).
[107]Maine Med. Ctr. v. Cote, 577 A.2d
1173, 1176 (Me. 1990).
[1]I would like to thank Jennifer Smith and Brandy
Matthews for their help in writing this speech.
[2] U.S. Const.
amend. I-X.
[3] William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.
L.Rev. 489, 502 (1977).
[4]Id. at 491.
[5]Chapter 29 of the 1225 version of Magna Carta stated:
No
freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of any freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or outlawed, or banished, or in any other way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send up on him, except by the legal
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or
justice.
William
F. Swindler, Magna Carta: Legend and Legacy 316-17 (1965).
As Swindler explains in this provision, the barons,
“for themselves and their tenants, . . . sought protection against unreasonable
exploitation of the instruments by which they could obtain their day in the
royal courts.” Id.
[6]See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The Road From Runnymeade: Magna Carta and
Constitutionalism in America, 6-8 (1968).
[7] Ala. Const.
art. I, § 13; Ariz. Const. art.
II, § 11; Ark. Const. art. II, §
13; Colo. Const. art. II, § 6; Conn. Const. art. I, § 10; Del. Const. art. I, § 9; Fla. Const. art. I, § 21; Ga. Const. art. I, § 1 para. 12; Idaho Const. art. I, § 18; Ill. Const. art. I, § 12; Ind. Const. art. I, § 12; Kan. Const. B. of R., § 18; Ky. Const. § 14; La. Const. art. I, § 22; Me. Const. art. I, § 13; Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, art. 19; Mass. Const. pt. 1, § 11; Minn. Const. art. 1 § 8; Miss. Const. art. III, § 24; Mo. Const. art. I, § 14; Mont. Const. art. II, § 16; Neb. Const. art. 1 § 13; N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 14; N.C. Const. art. I, § 18; N.D. Const. art. I, § 9; Ohio Const. art. I, § 16; Okla. Const. art. II, § 6; Or. Const. art. I, § 10; Pa. Const. art. I, § 11; R.I. Const. art. I, § 5; S.C. Const. art. I, § 9; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 20; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13; Utah Const. art. I, § 11; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4; Wash. Const. art. I, § 10; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 17; Wis. Const. art. I, § 9; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 8.
[8]Professor Jennifer Friesen has counted twenty-seven
state constitutions that require courts to be open, thirty-six that require
justice to be administered promptly, twenty-seven that require justice to be
administered without purchase or sale, thirty-four that require justice to be
granted completely and/or without denial, and eleven that require justice to be
delivered freely. Additionally,
thirty-five states provide a right to a remedy, of which twenty-one require the
remedy to be by due process or due course of law. Twenty-one states make the remedy available for injury or wrong
to person, property or reputation, thirteen provide it for injury to person,
property or character, and nine states extend it to injury or wrong to goods. Jennifer
Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and
Defenses, app. 6 at
6-65 to -67 (3d ed. 2000), adapted from Ronald K.L. Collins, Bills and Declarations of Rights
Digest, in The American Bench:
Judges of the Nation 2511-13 (1985).
[9]Ark. Const. art. II, § 13; Ill.
Const. art. I, § 12; Me. Const.
art. I, § 13; Md. Const. Decl. of
Rights, art. 19; Mass. Const. pt.
1, § 11; Minn. Const. art. 1 § 8;
N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 14; R.I. Const. art. I, § 5; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4; Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.
[10] Ala. Const.
art. I, § 13; Ariz. Const. art.
II, § 11; Colo. Const. art. II, §
6; Conn. Const. art. I, § 10; Del. Const. art. I, § 9; Fla. Const. art. I, § 21; Idaho Const. art. I, § 18; Ind. Const. art. I, § 12; Ky. Const. § 14; La. Const. art. I, § 22; Miss. Const. art. III, § 24; Mo. Const. art. I, § 14; Mont. Const. art. II, § 16; Neb. Const. art. 1 § 13; N.C. Const. art. I, § 18; N.D. Const. art. I, § 9; Ohio Const. art. I, § 16; Okla. Const. art. II, § 6; Or. Const. art. I, § 10; Pa. Const. art. I, § 11; S.C. Const. art. I, § 9; S.D. Const. art. I, § 11; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13; Utah Const. art. I, § 11; Wash. Const. art. I, § 10; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 17; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 8.
[11]Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 979
(Ariz. 1984) (three-year limitations provision with absolute bar on medical
malpractice claims three years from date of injury); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983) (twelve-year absolute statute of
limitations in products liability claims); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816,
825 (Okla. 1988) (three-year limitations provision without discovery rule in
medical malpractice suits).
[12]Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 706
S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Ohio
1986) (limitations tolled in medical malpractice suits only for minors under
ten years of age); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983)
(limitations tolled in medical malpractice suits only for minors under eight
years of age).
[13]Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp.,
435 So.2d 725, 729 (Ala. 1983) ( seven year statute of repose for claims
against architects and builders);
Overland Constr. Co. v. Scales, 369 So.2d 572, 575 (Fla. 1979) (twelve year
statute of repose for claims against architects and builders); Daugaard v.
Baltic, 349 N.W.2d 419, 426-27 (S.D. 1984) (six year statute of repose for
claims against architects and builders);
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 831 (Wyo. 1980) (ten year
statute of repose for claims against architects and builders).
[14]Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So.2d
996, 1007 (Ala. 1982)
(ten year statute of repose).
[15]Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes,
808 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Ky. 1991) (five year statute of repose for claims
against suppliers, manufacturers and
materialmen).
[16]Hanson v. Williams County, 389
N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D. 1986) (ten year, date-of-use statute of repose for
products liability claims); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 687
(Utah 1985) (six-year statute of repose for products liability claims).
[17]Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co.,
882 P.2d 11, 14 (N.M. 1994) (statute barring worker’s compensation unless
disability or death occurs within ten years of the last day of employment).
[18]Caruso v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 473
N.E.2d 818, 821 (Ohio 1984) (eight-year limitation on claims involving
silicosis-related death).
[19]Olien v. City of Sioux Falls, 393
N.W.2d 286, 291 (S.D. 1986) (sovereign immunity for municipalities in their proprietary
capacity of constructing, maintaining and operating parks); Laney v. Fairview City, No. 981729, 2002
Utah LEXIS 107 (Utah Aug. 9, 2002).
[20]Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc., 730 P.2d 186, 196 (Ariz. 1986) (defamation damages limited to special damages
unless a plaintiff could prove malice); Hanson v. Krehbiel, 75 P. 1041, 1042-44
(Kan. 1904) (same); Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 130-31 (Mont. 1978)
(same).
[21]Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347,
351 (Ky. 1932); Primes v. Tyler, 331
N.E.2d 723, 729 (Ohio 1975); Stewart v.
Houk, 271 P. 998, 999 (Or. 1928).
[22]Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 691
(Tex. 1988) (paralyzed child’s damages limited to $500,000).
[23]State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v.
Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979);
Mattos v.
Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Penn. 1980) (statute required arbitration in every
case where health care providers were defendants).
[24]Phoenix Newspapers v. Superior
Court, 418 P.2d 594, 597 (Ariz. 1966); In re Edens, 226 S.E.2d 5, 14 (N.C.
1976); KFGO Radio v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 511 (N.D. 1980); Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O’Leary, 736
P.2d 173, 178 (Or. 1987); Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803
(Wash. 1975); State ex rel. Herald Mail
v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 548 (W. Va. 1980); State v. Holm, 224 P.2d 500,
508 (Wyo. 1950); Jack B. Harrison, How
Open is Open? The Development of the Public Access Doctrine Under State Open
Court Provisions, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1307, 1308 (1992) (“The idea of public access to judicial proceedings is rooted
in the rich tradition of Anglo-American law.”); Louis F. Hubener, Rights of
Privacy in Open Courts — Do They Exist? 2
Emerging Issues St. Const. L. 189, 191-92 (1989) (open court provisions
originated as guarantees of legal remedies, not as guarantees of public access
to court proceedings).
[25]State el rel. Oregonian Publishing
Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23, 27 (Or. 1980).
[26]Flood v. State, 117 So. 385, 387
(Fla. 1928); Crocker v. Finley, 459 N.E.2d 1346, 1351 (Ill. 1984); Safety Net
for Abused Persons v. Segura, 692 So.2d 1038, 1042 (La. 1997) (filing fees may
be imposed only for purposes relating to the administration of justice), State
ex rel. Davidson v. Gorman, 41 N.W. 948, 950 (Minn. 1889); LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex.
1986) (unconstitutional to “pay tax for general welfare programs as a condition
to being allowed their right of access to the courts”).
[27]Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwall
County v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686, 693-94 (Tex. 1996) (only undisputed portion of
tax bill may be required to be prepaid as a condition for judicial review);
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 450 n.17 (Tex.
1993); State v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex. 1993) (state
cannot require state mineral lessees to pay disputed royalties before seeking
judicial review); Jensen v. State Tax Comm’n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992)
(statute requiring payment of delinquent taxes, interest, and penalties before
seeking review of assessment); see North Port Bank v. State Dept. of Revenues, 313 So.2d
683, 687 (Fla. 1975) (statute read liberally so as not to violate open courts
by requiring payment of taxes into registry of court or posting bond for such
amount ).
[28]Statute of limitations without discovery rule: Owen v.
Wilson, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Ark. 1976); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So2d 395
(La. 1986); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 501
A.2d 27, (Md. 1985); Harrison v.
Schraeder, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978); Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, (Tex.
1997) (upholding two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice
claims); Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995).
Limitations running against
minors: Main Medical Center v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me. 1990); Estate of
McCarthy v. Montana Second Judicial Dist. Court, Silverbow County, 994 P.2d
1090, 1093-95 (Mont. 1999); Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 682-83 (R.I. 1995).
Statutes of repose: Carter v.
Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920-21 (Ark. 1970) (architects and builders); Zapata v. Burns, 542 A.2d 700, 709-11 (Conn.
1988) (architects and engineers); Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 512 A.2d 893,
904-06 (Conn. 1986) (manufacturer); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. V. Lambertson
Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 417-18 (Del. 1984) (architects and builders); Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condominium Ass’n,
Inc., 321 S.E.3d 330, 413 (Ga. 1984) (architects, engineers, builders); Love v.
Whirlpool Corp., 449 S.E.3d 602 (Ga. 1994) (manufacturer); Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v.
Hammill, 644 P.2d 341, 346 (Idaho 1982) (architects and builders); Olson v. J.A. Freeman Co., 791 P.2d
1285, 1296-98 (Idaho 1990) (manufacturer); Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622
(Ind. 1983) (architects and builders); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Co., 418 N.E.2d
207, 212-13 (Ind. 1981) (manufacturer); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No.
2, 366 So.2d 1381, 1387 (La. 1978) (architects and builders); Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178, 189 (Md. 1985) (architects, builders,
and engineers); Klein v. Catalano, 437
N.E.2d 514, 522 (Mass. 1982) (architects and builders); Calder v. City of
Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Minn. 1982) (architects and builders); Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d
822, 833 (Mo. 1991) (upholding statute of repose for defects in improvements to
real property); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 647, 651 (Mont. 1976)
(architects and builders); Spilker v. City of Lincoln, 469 N.W.2d 546, 548-49
(Neb. 1991) (manufacturer); Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 404 N.W.2d 32, 34
(Neb. 1987) (professional negligence);
Tetterton v. Long Manuf. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67,72-73 (N.C. 1985)
(manufacturers); Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 880-82 (N.C. 1983)
(architects and builders); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915, 918-20 (Okla. 1989)
(builders and architects); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382
A.2d 715, 721 (Pa. 1978) (architects and builders); Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435,
439 (Or. 1989), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 65 (1990) (upholding products
liability statute of repose); Walsh v.
Gowing,494 A.2d 543, 547-48 (R.I. 1985) (architects, builders, engineers);
Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assoc., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1981)
(architects, engineers, builders); Jones v. Five Star Engineering, Inc., 717
S.W.2d 882, 882-83 (Tenn. 1986) (manufacturer); Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc.-Tex., 889 S.W.2d
259, 261-63 (Tex. 1994) (architects and engineers); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d
1194, 1197-1201 (Utah 1999) (builder’s statute of repose); 1519-1525 Lakeview Blvd. Condominium Ass’n
v. Apartment Sales Corp., 29 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Wash. 2001) (architects,
builders, and engineers); Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1293-95 (Wyo.
1991) (builder, architect, and manufacturer).
Sovereign immunity for
proprietary functions: Hardin v. City of DeValls Bluff, 508 S.W.2d 559, 563
(Ark. 1974); Sadler v. New Castle County, 565 A.2d 917, 923-24 (Del. 1989);
Carroll v. County of York, 437 A.2d 394, 396 (Pa. 1981); City of Tyler v.
Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 503 (Tex. 1997);
Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept., 412 S.E.2d 737, 743-45 (W. Va.
1991).
Statute permitting defamers
to retract or avoid liability: Davidson v. Rogers, 574 P.2d 624 (Or. 1978)
(statute limiting availability of general damages to cases where retraction was
requested and refused).
Statutes capping non-economic
damages for medical malpractice damages: Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So.2d
189, 193-96 (Fla. 1993) (statute providing monetary cap on noneconomic damages
when party requests arbitration); Adams
v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905-06 (Mo. 1992).
Requiring screening by
experts before filing medical malpractice claims: Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
404 N.E.2d 585, 595-96 (Ind. 1980); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1268-69
(La. 1978); Irish v. Gimbel, 691 A.2d 664, 672-73 (Me. 1997); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1190-91
(Mont. 1981); Prendergrast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-65 (Neb. 1977).
Guest statutes: Pickett v.
Matthews, 192 So. 261, 264 (Ala. 1939); Roberson v. Roberson, 101 S.W.2d 961,
966 (Ark. 1937); Gallegher v. Davis,
183 A. 620, 626 (Del. 1936); Vogts v. Guerette, 351 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1960); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362, 364 (Kan. 1974);
Sidle v. Majors, 341 S.E.2d 763, 775 (Ind. 1976); Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86, 88 (S.D. 1975); Perozzi v.
Ganiere, 42 P.2d 1009 (Or. 1935).
Closing judicial proceedings
to the public: State v. Birdsong, 422 So.2d 1135, 1139 (La. 1982); Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp.,
515 S.E.2d 675, 694 (N.C. 1999); State ex rel. Garden State Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hoke, 520 S.E.2d 186, 196 (W. Va. 1999).
Closing juvenile proceedings
to the public: In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 450 (Ohio 1990).
Filing fees funding state
general revenue: Fox v. Hunt, 619 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Ala. 1993); Harrison,
Pepper & Co. v. Willis, 54 Tenn. 35, 49-50 (1871).
Penalties
paid before challenged in court: Old
Colony R.R. Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 35 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Mass. 1941)
(restricting the right to litigate until taxes have been paid does not violate
the remedies clause); Heikes
v. Clay County, 526 N.W.2d 253, 255 (S.D. 1995) (requiring back tax payment as
a condition to recover property sold for unpaid taxes is not unconstitutional).
[29]William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening
Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I,
Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 333, 341 (1997).
[30]John Bauman, Remedies Provisions
in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 243, 244 (1991)
(“[B]oth [of the major] variations have been expansively and narrowly
interpreted.”).
[31]Some commentators have enthused that the history,
culture, or genius of a particular state can explain varying interpretations of
the state constitutional clauses. See,
e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 84 Va. L.
Rev. 389 (1998), and authorites cited therein. This is a dubious general proposition, see, e.g., Paul W.
Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129 (1993), and it seems
particularly irrelevant in remedies jurisprudence.
[32]See Koch, Jr., supra note
31, at 437-39
[33]Note, Constitutional Guarantees
of a Certain Remedy, 49 Iowa L. Rev.
1202, 120-04 (1964) (“[R]ecords of constitutional conventions which
adopted certain-remedy clauses are virtually devoid of any clues as to the
intentions of the framers.”).
[34]In many states, the right to a
remedy is in the constitution, but there is no indication that it was even
discussed by the framers during the full convention: see, e.g., Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
of the State of Alabama,
May 21st, 1901, to September 3rd, 1901 (1940); The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910 660,
1238 (John S. Goff ed., Supreme Court of Arizona n.d.); Debates and Proceedings of the Convention to form a Constitution for
the State of Arkansas 355, 584, 656-57 (J.G. Price 1868); Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
held in Denver, December 20, 1875 to Frame a Constitution for the State of
Colorado 89, 142, 376, 486, 523-24 (The Smith-Brooks Press 1907); Journal of the Constitutional Convention of
Connecticut 169-70, 445 (Hartford Press 1902); Journal of the Public and Secret Proceedings of the Convention of
the People of Georgia 195, 235, 286 (Boughton, Nisbet & Barnes
1861); The Constitutional Debates of
1847 866-67 (Arthur Charles Cole, ed., Illinois State Historical Library
1919); Journal of the Convention of the
People of the State of Indiana 186-88,
571, 579, 868, 872 (Austin H. Brown 1851); Debates in the Indiana Convention 299, 1368, 1389, 2067 (Indiana
Historical Collections 1850); The
Debates, Resolutions, and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates, for
the State of Maine 69, 91 (Jeremiah Perley ed., J. Shirley, Printer
1820); Debates of the Maryland
Constitutional Convention of 1867 78, 141 (Hepbron & Haydon 1923); Journal of the Convention for Framing a
Constitution of Government for the State of Massachusetts 35, 38, 225
(Dutton and Wentworth 1832); Official
Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the First Constitutional Convention of
North Dakota appendix v. (Tribune, State Printers and Binders 1889); The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 120, 310, 343, 468 (Charles
Henry Carey ed., State Printing Dep’t 1926); Journal
of the Convention of the State of Tennessee 184, 391-92 (W. Hasell Hunt
& Co. Printers 1834).
[35]E.g., Proceedings
of the Assembly of the Lower Counties of Delaware 1770-1776, of the
Constitutional Convention of 1776, and of the House of Assembly of the Delaware
State 784; Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 372, 2051 (I. W. Hart
ed., Caxton Printers, LTD 1912) (provision adopted after delegates substituted
“for” in place of “to”); 2 Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution
of Pennsylvania of 1873, at 734-44 (Harrisburg: Benjamin Singerly, State
Printer 1873); 4 Debates 647, 755 (provision “that no law shall limit the amount
of damages recoverable, and where an injury caused by negligence or misconduct
results in death the action shall survive” struck from remedies clause because
already incorporated in constitutional restrictions on legislative branch).
[36]In Lousiana, the 1974
Constitutional Convention rejected this proposed addition to the state’s
existing remedies clause: “Neither the state, its political subdivisions, nor
any private person shall be immune from suit and liability.” From this, the
Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that
the framers “did not intend to limit the legislature’s ability to restrict
causes of action or to bar the legislature from creating various areas of
statutory immunity from suit.” Crier v. Whitehead, 496 So.2d 305, 309-10 (La.
1986).
In Ohio, the right to a remedy was
included in the 1802 Constitution. Art.
VIII, § 7. When it was omitted from the bill of rights Committee’s draft at the
1851 convention, delegate Rufus Ranney
moved from the floor to restore it. This exchange then occurred:
Mr. Ranney said he perceived that
the [Standing] Committee [on the Preamble and the Bill of Rights] had left out
of this report a number of articles in the old bill of rights. He had copied
one of them, and would move its adoption as an additional section ¼
¼
¼ Mr. Hitchcock of Geauga, had no
objection, to the amendment, if it could be carried out. Justice should
certainly be administered without denial or delay, but delay could not possibly
be avoided in the Courts, unless they could have a gag-law there, as well as in
this body¼The section was agreed to.
Report of
the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the
Constitution of the State of Ohio 337 (1851)), quoted in In re T.R. v. Solove, 556 N.E.2d 439, 447 n.7 (Ohio 1990). For a history of the remedies clause in the Ohio Constitution, see
E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 125 N.E.2d 896, 905-07 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955)
(holding that the open courts clause gives a public right of access to the
courts).
There is a possible suggestion from
Minnesota that the guarantee was more popular with Republicans than Democrats
in the 1850s. The Republican and Democratic delegates convened apart from one
another and their debates were separately published. Compare Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention for the Territory of Minnesota 105 (St. Paul 1858) (Republican), with The Debates and Proceedings of the Minnesota
Constitutional Convention 203-04, 652 (Earle S. Goodrich 1857)
(Democratic).
The Committee on the Bill of Rights
of the 1868 Mississippi Convention,
initially recommended this provision: “All persons for injuries suffered
in person, reputation, or property, shall have their remedy by due course of
law.” Journal of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi 84 (E. Stafford
1871). The following week, the Committee recommended the following addition:
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
justice administered without denial or delay.” Id. at 131. The next
week, the Committee proposed another draft, omitting any type of remedies
provision. Id. at 155-57. Nothing
in the record indicates why any of these actions were taken. Thus the 1868 Constitution
contained no remedies clause, although it was present in the 1850 Constitution.
[37]Kentucky’s remedies clause was part
of the Bill of Rights in its first constitution of 1792. New remedy-related
provisions (Sections 54 and 241) were added during the Constitutional
Convention of 1891. See Proceedings
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1890 444 (1890). The Kentucky Supreme Court has referred to the three
sections of its constitution as the “open courts” provisions. Thomas P. Lewis, Jural Rights Under
Kentucky’s Constitution: Realities Grounded in Myth, 80 K.Y. L.J. 953, 953-54
(1992).
[38]“The guarantee of open courts”: Clouse v. State, 16
P.3d 757, 769 (Ariz. 2001); Moses v.
Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo. 1993); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del. 2001); Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1119
(Idaho 2000); Boggs v. Tri-State
Radiology, 730 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ind. 2000);
Boykins v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 842 S.W.2d 547, 529 (Ky.
1992); Crier v. Whitehead, 496 So.2d 305 (La. 1986); Maine Med. Ctr. v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me. 1996); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d
898, 905 (Mo. 1992); MacPheat v.
Schaut, 41 P.3d 895, 898 (Mont. 2002);
Givens v. Anchor Packing, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Neb. 1991); Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp.,
515 S.E.2d 675, 692 (N.C. 1999); Federal Land Bank v. Zeibarth, 520 N.W.2d 51,
56 (N.D. 1994); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 783 (Ohio 1991) (Sweeney, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part); State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News v.
Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 1307 n.6 (Or. 1996); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A.2d
318, 322 (Pa. 1980); Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, 557 N.W.2d 396, 399
(S.D. 1996); Ferguson v. Ram Enters., Inc., 900 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tenn.
1995); Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988); Cruz v.
Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 869 (Utah 1988).
“Access to the courts”:
Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. Partnership I, 817 P.2d 527, 533 (Colo. 1991); Spencer v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 823
So.2d 752, 754 (Fla. 2002); Osmunson v. State, 17 P.3d 236, 238
(Idaho 2000); Best v. Taylor Mach.
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1111 (Ill. 1997);
Fann v. McGuffy, 534 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ky. 1975); Whitnell v. Silverman, 686 So.2d 23, 25 (La.
1996); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 113 (Md. 1992); Fischer v. State Highway Comm’n, 948 S.W.2d
607, 611 (Mo. 1997); Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002);
State ex rel. Tyler v. Douglass County Dist. Court, 580 N.W.2d 95, 98
(Neb. 1998); Town of Nottingham v.
Newman, 785 A.2d 891, 895 (N.H. 2001); Mayer v. Bristow, 740 N.E.2d 656, 664
(Ohio. 2000); Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 417 A.2d 195, 197 (R.I.
1984).
“Remedy”: Helman v. State,
784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del. 2001); McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind. 2000);
Mohundro v. Alcorn County, 675 So.2d 848, 852 (Miss. 1996); Meech v. Millhaven
W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 497 (Mont. 1989); Jensen v. Whitlow, 51 P.3d 599, 601
(Or. 2002); Kennedy v. Cumberland
Engineering Co., 417 A.2d 195, 201 (R.I. 1984) (Murray, J., dissenting).
“Right to courts”: Huff v.
State, 549 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 2001)
“Certain remedy”: Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689
N.E.2d 1057, 1111 (Ill. 1997); Fischer v. State Highway Comm’n, 948 S.W.2d 607, 611
(Mo. 1997)
“Guaranteed remedy”: In re
Abbott, 653 A.2d 1113, 1116 (N.H. 1995); Pritchard v. Portland, 796 P.2d
1184, 1187 (Or. 1990).
“Right to remedy”: Baugher v.
Beaver Constr. Co., 791 So.2d 932, 934 (Ala. 2000); McAlister
v. Schick, 588 N.E.2d 1151, 1157 (Ill. 1992);
Appeal of Wimtle, 781 A.2d 995, 997 (N.H. 2001); Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1132 (Ohio 2001)
(Cook, J., dissenting)
“Remedy by due course of
law”: McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 976
(Ind. 2000)
Some
states call it by a mix of these names: Compare Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,
863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo. 1993) (open courts), with Sigman v. Seafood
Ltd. Partnership I, 817 P.2d 527, 533 (Colo. 1991) (access to courts); see Helman
v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del. 2001) (open courts and remedy); compare Kirkland
v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1119 (Idaho 2000) (“open courts”), with Osmunson v. State, 17 P.3d 236, 238 (Idaho
2000) (“access to the courts”); compare
McAlister v. Schick, 588 N.E.2d 1151, 1157 (Ill. 1992), with Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1111 (Ill. 1997) (“certain remedy” and
“access to courts”); compare McIntosh
v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 975-76 (Ind. 2000) (“remedies”, “open courts”,
and “remedy by due course of law”), with Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology,
730 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ind. 2000) (“open courts”); compare Boykins v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 842
S.W.2d 547, 529 (Ky. 1992) (“open courts”), with Fann v. McGuffy, 534
S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ky. 1975) (“access to the courts”); compare Boykins v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 842
S.W.2d 547, 529 (Ky. 1992) (“open courts”), with Fann v. McGuffy, 534
S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ky. 1975) (“access to the courts”); compare Asbestos Plaintiffs v. Borden, Inc., 630 So.2d
1310, 1311 (La. 1994), with Whitnell v. Silverman, 686 So.2d 23, 25 (La.
1996); compare Fischer v. State Highway Comm’n, 948 S.W.2d 607, 611
(Mo. 1997) (“access to the courts” and “certain remedy”), with Adams
v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Mo. 1992) (“open courts”); compare
MacPheat v. Schaut, 41 P.3d 895, 898 (Mont. 2002) (“open courts”), with
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002) (“access to
courts”), and Meech
v. Millhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 497 (Mont. 1989) (“remedy”); compare Givens v. Anchor Packing, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 771, 778
(Neb. 1991) (“open courts”), with .State ex rel. Tyler v. Douglass County Dist. Court,
580 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Neb. 1998) (“acess to the courts”); compare Town of
Nottingham v. Newman, 785 A.2d 891, 895 (N.H. 2001) (“access to the courts”), with
In re Abbott, 653 A.2d 1113, 1116 (N.H. 1995) (“guaranteed remedy”), and
Appeal of Wimtle, 781 A.2d 995, 997 (N.H. 2001) (“right to remedy”); compare
Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 783 (Ohio 1991) (Sweeney, J., concurring
and dissenting in part) (“open courts”), with Mayer v. Bristow,
740 N.E.2d 656, 664 (Ohio. 2000) (“access to courts”), and Holeton v.
Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1132 (Ohio 2001) (Cook, J., dissenting)
(“right to remedy”); compare State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News v.
Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 1307 n.6 (Or. 1996) (“open courts”), with Jensen v. Whitlow, 51 P.3d 599, 601
(Or. 2002) (“remedy”), and Pritchard v. Portland, 796 P.2d
1184, 1187 (Or. 1990) (“guaranteed remedy”); compare Kennedy v.
Cumberland Engineering Co., 417 A.2d 195, 197 (R.I. 1984) (“access to
the courts”), with id. 201 (Murray, J., dissenting) (“remedy”).
[39]See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929)
(concluding that the “Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights,
or the abolition of old ones recognized by common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object”); see also
Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1338 (D. Md. 1989)
(concluding that a statute imposing limits on damages in personal injury cases
did not violate the remedies clause on due process grounds because it was
reasonably related to a legitimate legislative goal); Jennifer Friesen, State
Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims and Defenses, §
6-2, n. 1 (3d ed. 2000) (“[I]t is unclear, outside the criminal context, to
what extent the federal Constitution requires the states to assure meaningful
access to courts to enforce ordinary civil claims.”) (citing Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law,
753 (2d ed. 1988); see also Janice Sue Wang, State Constitutional
Remedy Provisions and Article I, Section 10 of the Washington State
Constitution: The Possibility of Greater Judicial Protection of Established
Tort Causes of Action and Remedies, 64 Wash.
L. Rev. 203 (1989) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has construed, somewhat
ambivalently, a federal constitutional right to a remedy in the jurisdictional
sense: access to courts in order to pursue a legal remedy.”).
Since
Silver, the Court has passed up
opportunities to incorporate the right to a remedy into due process. For example, in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Group, Inc., the
Supreme Court rejected a federal due process challenge to the Price-Anderson
Act, which sets a $560 million cap on liability for private nuclear power plant
accidents. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). After holding that the provision was
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, the Court turned to the
argument that the cap “fail[ed] to provide those injured by a nuclear accident
with a satisfactory quid pro quo for the common law rights of recovery
which the Act abrogates.” Id. at
87-88. The court noted that “it is not
at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively
enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or
provide a reasonable substitute remedy.” Id. Although by footnote the Court cites eight cases either directly
rejecting or suggesting a rejection of a federal remedies challenge, it did
“not resolve” the issue because it concluded that the Act “provide[d] a
reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it
replace[d].” Id. at 88.
The Supreme Court passed up another opportunity in
Fein v. Permanente Med. Group. 474 U.S.
892 (1985). In that case, the Supreme
Court declined for want of a substantial federal question to review a state
supreme court decision upholding non-economic damage caps on medical
malpractice awards. Id. at
892. Justice White dissented, stating
he would have granted certiorari to consider the question left open in Duke
— whether federal due process requires a quid pro quo when a state replaces a
common law remedy with a compensation statute. Id. at 893.
[40]As rendered into modern English,
Chapter 29 provided:
NO freeman shall be taken or
imprisoned or disseised of any freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or outlawed, or banished, or in
any other way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him,
nor send upon him, except by the legal
judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land. To no one will we sell, to
no one will we deny, or delay right
or justice.
William F.
Swindler, Magna Carta: Legend and Legacy 316-17
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
The original Latin text can be found at Faith Thompson, The
First Century of Magna Carta: Why It Persisted as a Document 111 (New
York: Russell & Russell, 1967) .
The motivations for the original
guarantee are actually easier to discern than that of our own states’ framers.
The barons had little interest in abstract pronouncements of ideal governance;
they were after specific language to compel particular action. See William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter
of King John 51-52, 120 (Glasgow: J. Maclehose and Sons, 2d ed.
1914). The barons were displeased
because the royal courts, which were fast displacing local feudal courts as the
preferred forum for dispute resolution, operated on a fee scale, with different
charges for particular writs. “The
system invited abuse; more expensive writs worked faster than cheaper ones,
were more potent, and could achieve a more favorable forum.” David Schuman, Oregon’s
Remedy Guarantee: Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 Or. L. Rev. 35, 37 (1986). By eliminating these fees the barons not
only alleviated this disparity, but increased the chances that royal courts
would recede in importance. If free
royal justice were unprofitable, the barons might increase their “market share”
and regain the power and prestige of operating successful local courts. See William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter
of King John 80-81, 87-90 (Glasgow: J. Maclehose and Sons, 2d ed. 1914)
(chronicling the writ system’s role, in conjunction with the conversion of
county courts to royal courts, in “diverting the stream of litigation from the
barons’ courts to the [royal courts],” and recognizing the Crown’s plan to
overthrow the jurisdiction of the baronial courts while also profiting from the
rigid writ system).
[41]See Hastings Lyon & Herman
Block, Edward
Coke: Oracle of the Law 348 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1929).
[42]Edward
Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws
of England 45 (New York: William S. Hein Co., 1986)
[43]Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.,
23 P.3d 333, 341, 332 Ore. 83, 96 (2001) (explaining Coke’s view that the
second sentence of the Magna Carta evolved into a guarantee involving private
relations).
[44]Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws
of England 55 (New York: William S. Hein Co., 1986).
[45]See supra note 8.
[46]“For the principal aim of society is to protect
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which are vested in them
by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace
without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the
institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is
to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals. Such
rights as are social and relative result from, and are posterior to, the
formation of states and societies: so that to maintain and regulate these, is
clearly a subsequent consideration.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *124. For example, protection from homicide is an absolute right; an import
duty on wool is a relative right. Man’s
laws may either permit or forbid relative rights without offending natural
law. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *42-43, 126.
[47]Id. * 123-24. One good secondary treatise on Blackstone is Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Law, From the Abridged Edition of Wm. Hardcastle Browne
Including a Biographical Sketch, Modern Notes, Common Law Maxims and a Glossary
of Legal Terms (Bernard C. Gavit, ed., Washington Law Book Co. 1941).
[48]Personal security included the
right to life and limb, and, less importantly, to body, health, and
reputation. Personal liberty
encompassed freedom of movement and freedom from imprisonment without due
course of law. Property rights include
the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of acquisitions, without interference or
diminution except by law. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *129-40.
[49]The four main categories of relative rights are the
relationships between master and servant, husband and wife, parent and child,
and guardian and ward. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23.
[50]1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *140-41.
[51]The other four subordinate rights include the
constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; the limitations of the
king’s prerogative; the right to petition the king or either house of
parliament for redress of injury; the right to bear arms in self-defense. 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *141-44.
[52]“Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions,
of the law, but also the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be
altered but by parliament; for if once those outworks were demolished, there
would be an inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itself.” 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries *142.
[53]3 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *116.
[54]3 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *109.
[55]1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *141 (“Since the law is in England the supreme
arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at
all times be open to the subject and the law be duly administered therein” to
satisfy the subordinate right of “applying to the courts of justice for redress
of injuries”).
[56]Dr. Bonham’s case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610)
(declaring in dicta “that in many cases, the common law will controul acts of
parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void”). See Douglas W. Vick, The Human
Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 329, 335 n.43 (2002) (dismissing the
influence of Bonham’s dicta on the ability of courts to control acts of
parliament, noting that Coke’s view
“never took hold,” with “Coke himself seem[ing] to repudiate it” in later
writings).
[57]1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *161 (recounting Sir Matthew Hale’s observation). Thus, so long as the English Constitution lasted, the power of
parliament would be “absolute and without control.” 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *162.
[58]One observer notes even Hoffman admits that “Lord Coke
was a fervent advocate of parliamentary supremacy, whereas the colonists ended
up resisting parliamentary as well as royal authority.” Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the
Law: The Origins of the Open Courts
Clause of State Constitutions, 74
Or. L. Rev. 1279, 1301 (1995) (discussing Britain’s perceived
interference with American colonial courts prior to the American Revolution,
and comparing colonial grievances over royal abuses with the conflict between
Coke and the Crown 150 years earlier).